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THE INSTITUTIONAL SPEECH OR DEBATE
PROTECTION: NONDISCLOSURE AS
SEPARATION OF POWERS
ETHAN L. CARROLL†
ABSTRACT
The Speech or Debate Clause encompasses certain privileges that
inure to the benefit of legislators. But its nondisclosure protection
secures
legislative—not
legislators’—independence.
This
nondisclosure protection provides Congress as an institution the
procedural right to assert its interests prior to the executive branch’s
compelling the disclosure of legislative acts and corresponding
documentary materials. Reading the opinion of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Rayburn House
Office Building as a separation-of-powers case distinguishes this
institutional, procedural protection from a so-called “nondisclosure
privilege” against any compelled disclosure, which was rejected by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Renzi.
The D.C. Circuit’s construction of the Speech or Debate Clause in
Rayburn leaves executive-branch officials considerable latitude to
investigate Members of Congress, subject to procedural constraints.
Because the value the Clause protects is democratic representation,
rather than legislative independence per se, the question of
nondisclosure is one of protective procedure, not of privilege:
Congress, not the executive branch, gets to make first determinations
as to privilege.

INTRODUCTION
James Madison wrote in The Federalist that after defining the
three classes of constitutional power—“legislative, executive, and
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judiciary”—“the next and most difficult task” was “to provide some
1
practical security for each against the invasion of the others.”
Originally written in outlining the American constitutional scheme
for separation of powers, these words assumed new significance 218
years later when, on May 20, 2006, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) officials entered, sealed, and searched the congressional office
of then-Congressman William Jefferson, the first time an executive
agency had ever searched without permission the Capitol Hill office
2
of a sitting Member of Congress.
3
A few months later, federal prosecutors opened an investigation
of then-Congressman Richard Renzi for honest services wire fraud in
connection with his allegedly bribed promises to sponsor federal
4
public-land-exchange legislation. In the course of the investigation
5
and pursuant to a Title III order, the FBI tapped the Congressman’s
6
personal cell phone. The FBI also reviewed documents Congressman
7
Renzi’s aide took from the Congressman’s office.
Congressmen Renzi and Jefferson both challenged the respective
investigations as violating Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the
8
Constitution (the Speech or Debate Clause), which provides that
“for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and
9
Representatives] shall not be questioned.” The D.C. Circuit’s holding
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. David Stout, Ex-Louisiana Congressman Sentenced to 13 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2009, at A14.
3. Max Blumenthal, Porn Cop vs. US Attorney, NATION, Apr. 9, 2007, at 6.
4. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011).
5. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82
Stat. 197, 221 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012)) (establishing procedures
for obtaining warrants to authorize wiretapping by government officials).
6. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1018 n.6.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
9. Id. The full text of the Clause is as follows:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to
be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall
in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going
to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place.
Id. (emphasis added). Throughout this Note, the word “they” is replaced with “Senators and
Representatives,” as “they” most naturally reads as referring to the direct object of the
paragraph, “The Senators and Representatives.” Cf. Wells Harrell, Note, The Speech or Debate
Clause Should Not Confer Evidentiary or Non-Disclosure Privileges, 98 VA. L. REV. 385, 396
(2012) (“[The Clause] has a direct object: ‘they,’ the ‘Senators and Representatives’ who are
questioned.”).
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in United States v. Rayburn House Office Building that “the
compelled disclosure of privileged material to the Executive during
execution of the search warrant . . . [for Congressman Jefferson’s
11
office] violated the Speech or Debate Clause” set off a firestorm of
commentary, as it was the first time a federal court of appeals had
12
construed the Clause to encompass a “nondisclosure privilege.” The
13
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Renzi declined to follow the D.C.
Circuit, refusing to recognize this “grandiose, yet apparently shy,
14
privilege of non-disclosure,”
which “would jeopardize law
15
enforcement tools that have never been considered problematic.”
The Speech or Debate Clause (the Clause) “protect[s] against
possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a
16
hostile judiciary.” The paradigmatic abuse against which the Clause
protects is an executive-branch official harassing a legislator and that
harassment influencing the legislator’s vote, thus frustrating
17
democratic representation.
As such, the Clause safeguards
10. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
11. Id. at 656.
12. In many instances, this Note refers to the Clause’s protection of Members from
executive-branch-compelled disclosure of legislative-act material as a “nondisclosure
privilege”—a turn of phrase introduced by the Renzi court—despite the Note’s conclusion that
the term is a misnomer, as the Clause is better thought of as encompassing an institutional
nondisclosure protection. See infra note 200 and accompanying text. The latter terminology
avoids conflating the evidentiary privileges the Clause affords individual Members with its
protection of Congress as an institution.
13. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011).
14. Id. at 1032.
15. Id. at 1034 (quoting Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 671 (Henderson, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
16. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178–79 (1966) (discerning this purpose from
the Clause’s role in English constitutional history prior to the Glorious Revolution). The
Clause’s history is outlined in much greater and more critical detail elsewhere. See generally
Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1973). For a discussion of the Clause’s origin in Article IX of the
English Bill of Rights, see infra Part III.C.1.
17. See David M. Lederkramer, Note, A Statutory Proposal for Case-by-Case
Congressional Waiver of the Speech or Debate Privilege in Bribery Cases, 3 CARDOZO L. REV.
465, 492–95 (1981) (demonstrating the potential for the executive branch to control legislators’
behavior). For discussion of what I have chosen to call the Clause’s representation principle, see
infra notes 160, 202 and accompanying text. Cf. generally Anita Bernstein, Note, Executive
Targeting of Congressmen as a Violation of the Arrest Clause, 94 YALE L.J. 647 (1985) (arguing
that executive-branch targeting of Members, as in the ABSCAM investigation, violates the
Arrest Clause and ultimately harms constituents by preventing their full participation in the
legislative process); Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Attorney Gen., The Federal Prosecutor, Address
at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 19 (1940) (“With the law books filled with a great assortment of
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democratic representation and legislative independence by endowing
18
Members with certain privileges. This Note argues, however, that
the Clause does not vest in each individual Member an absolute
privilege against the compelled disclosure of legislative acts and
corresponding documentary materials (so-called legislative-act
19
materials). Instead, it provides Congress as an institution the right to
assert its institutional interests—often through House or Senate
Counsel—prior to the executive branch’s compelling the disclosure of
legislative-act materials. Although the Clause allows Congress to
resist the executive branch as a matter of political power, it leaves
prosecutors considerable room to investigate individual Members’
alleged wrongdoing, subject to procedural constraints.
Since the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rayburn, much scholarship
analyzing the Speech or Debate Clause has relied on the separation20
of-powers doctrine—or the balance of powers generally —to support
21
both broad and narrow constructions of the Clause’s scope. The
most persuasive of these explanations and critiques of the Rayburn
court’s construction of the Clause suggest a wholesale scaling back of

crimes, . . . law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being
unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong political
views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor himself.”).
18. See infra Part I.
19. This Note refers throughout to “legislative acts and corresponding documentary
materials” as “legislative-act materials.” See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Renzi, 651
F.3d 1012 (No. 11-557) (referring to “legislative-act materials”). For a discussion of protected
“legislative acts,” see infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
20. See generally, e.g., Emily E. Eineman, Note, Congressional Criminality and Balance of
Powers: Are Internal Filter Teams Really What Our Forefathers Envisioned?, 16 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 595 (2007); A.J. Green, Note, United States v. Renzi: Reigning in the Speech or
Debate Clause To Fight Corruption in Congress Post-Rayburn, 2012 BYU L. REV. 493 (2012).
Although ultimately misguided, these notes cite to the Supreme Court’s statement, “Our
task . . . is to apply the Clause in such a way as to insure the independence of the legislature
without altering the historic balance of the three co-equal branches of Government.” United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972); cf. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as
Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1952 (2011) (“[F]unctionalists view the
Constitution as emphasizing the balance, and not the separation, of powers.”).
21. For a broad construction, see generally, for example, Steven F. Huefner, Congressional
Searches and Seizures: The Place of Legislative Privilege, 24 J.L. & POL. 271 (2008) (referring
throughout to the “proper separation of powers”); and Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16
(calling for separation-of-powers concerns to define the scope of the Clause, which should be
construed in light of Members’ present-day responsibilities). For a narrow construction, see, for
example, Harrell, supra note 9 at 388, 404 (balancing a “structural interest in anti-corruption”
against legislative independence on a separation-of-powers theory that counsels “balancing the
powers of the federal branches”).
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the Supreme Court’s Speech or Debate Clause jurisprudence, a
23
qualified privilege in criminal investigations, or a presumption
against search warrants for documentary evidence in congressional
24
offices. These approaches err, however, in how they apply the
Court’s separation-of-powers cases to the Speech or Debate Clause
context. They appeal to the separation-of-powers doctrine in the
25
abstract or solely in support of leading arguments about the scope of
the Speech or Debate Clause. And they are not alone—portions of
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Rayburn belie Rayburn’s effect as a
26
separation-of-powers case.
This Note aims to refocus the discussion about the Clause’s
nondisclosure protection from the current focus on legislators’
independence to a proper focus on legislative independence. To do so,
it recasts the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Rayburn through separationof-powers analysis, emphasizing both the Clause’s institutional value
and the case’s outcome: the Rayburn court returned to Congressman
Jefferson the right to make a first determination as to which materials
27
were legislative in nature. This recasting underscores the limited
28
nature of Rayburn’s holding, situates Rayburn within the Supreme

22. One note argues that the evidentiary privilege recognized in United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169 (1966), “lacks basis in text or prior precedent,” as does the recognition of a
nondisclosure privilege in United States v. Rayburn. See Harrell, supra note 9 at 385–88. The
gravamen of its argument is the claim that courts have erred in “failing to weigh the (admittedly
important) interest in preserving separation of powers against the federal government’s
significant interest in combatting bribery among federal legislators.” Id. at 404 (emphasis
added). This Note responds directly to that argument by outlining the separation-of-powers
argument with greater precision in Parts III–IV, which are responsive to that note’s approach of
purporting to “weigh” the executive branch’s interest in policing corruption against Congress’s
interest in the prior assertion of its privilege. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
23. See generally Recent Case, United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654
(D.C. Cir. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 914 (2008) (arguing by analogy to United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974), that a qualified privilege in criminal investigations of Members would
satisfy separation-of-powers concerns).
24. See generally Huefner, supra note 21.
25. For a summary of Professor Manning’s criticism of analysis that relies upon such a
freestanding separation-of-powers principle, see infra Part IV.A.
26. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 655 (2007)
(“[Resolution of this case] requires . . . a balancing of the separation of powers underlying the
Speech or Debate Clause and the Executive’s Article II, Section 3 law enforcement interest in
the seized materials.”).
27. Id. at 658.
28. Congressman Jefferson prevailed in his claim “only that the warrant
procedures . . . were flawed because they afforded him no opportunity to assert the privilege
before the Executive scoured his records.” Id. at 662.
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29

Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence, and provides the basis
for concluding that the Ninth Circuit in Renzi not only misconstrued
the Clause, but also mischaracterized the “nondisclosure privilege”
that it declined to recognize. The nondisclosure protection is a matter
of procedure, not privilege: Congress, not the executive branch, gets
to make first determinations as to the applicability of its privilege.
Part I provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s Speech
or Debate Clause cases, before Part II describes the facts of Rayburn
and Renzi and summarizes each court’s holding in each case. Part III
reinterprets Rayburn through the lens of formalist separation-of30
powers analysis. Part IV then turns to functionalist analysis: Part
IV.A provides a framework for functionalist separation-of-powers
analysis. Part IV.B demonstrates that this functionalist analysis would
reach the same conclusion as the formalist analysis on the facts of
Rayburn. Part IV.C uses the difference between Rayburn’s outcome
and that of the Supreme Court’s bribery cases to address the
arguments of some commentators who would “weigh” or “balance”
Congress’s interest in the prior assertion of its privilege against
interests of the executive branch—like policing corruption. Finally,
Part IV.D argues that the Renzi court erred in failing to critically
define the nondisclosure protection it refused to recognize.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE CASES
This Part provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s
Speech or Debate Clause cases. The next Part builds on the context
provided here in summarizing the holdings in Rayburn and Renzi. For
ease of reference, this Part breaks these cases into the categories of
legislative-immunity cases, bribery cases, and oversight cases, and
highlights the importance of each kind of case to executive-branch
investigations of alleged congressional wrongdoing.

29. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966) (“In the American governmental
structure the [Speech or Debate] [C]lause serves the . . . function of reinforcing the separation
of powers so deliberately established by the Founders.”). The separation of powers is explicitly
invoked in the Court’s other Speech or Debate Clause cases, too. E.g., United States v.
Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491–92 (1979); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 334 (1973) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972);
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972).
30. The Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers cases can be read as existing along a
formalist/functionalist dichotomy. See Manning, supra note 20, at 1942–43.
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A. The Legislative-Immunity Cases
The Speech or Debate Clause received relatively little attention
31
during the Constitutional Convention, but early judicial decisions
recognized that the Clause conferred immunity from prosecution for
legislative acts. An 1808 case in the Supreme Judicial Court of
32
Massachusetts, Coffin v. Coffin, was the first American case to
interpret the scope of legislative privilege, construing the
Massachusetts Constitution—which contained a provision similar to
33
the Speech or Debate Clause —not to protect the slanderous speech
34
of Representative Micajah Coffin. Coffin’s legacy, however, is not its
narrow holding but its broad dicta, with Chief Justice Parsons writing
for the court:
[T]he article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally . . . . I
will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or
haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to the
making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the
nature, and in the execution, of the office; and I would define the
article as securing to every member exemption from prosecution, for
everything said or done by him as a representative, in the exercise of
the functions of that office, without inquiring whether the exercise
was regular, according to the rules of the house, or irregular and
against their rules. . . . I am satisfied that there are cases in which he
is entitled to this privilege, when not within the walls of the
35
representatives’ chamber.

During the first 177 years of the Constitution’s life, the Supreme
Court construed the Clause only twice. In the first federal case to
36
interpret the Speech or Debate Clause, Kilbourn v. Thompson, the
37
Court quoted Coffin’s dicta with approval. It held that Members of
the House of Representatives were not liable for their vote

31. For a discussion of the Clause’s drafting history, see infra Part III.C.1.
32. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
33. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided: “The freedom of deliberation,
speech and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people,
that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action, or complaint, in any
other court or place whatsoever.” MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XXI, reprinted in 3 FRANCIS
NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1892 (1909).
34. Coffin, 4 Mass. at 27.
35. Id.
36. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
37. See id. at 203–04 (“It seems to us that the views expressed in the authorities we have
cited are sound and are applicable to this case.”).
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improperly holding a private citizen in contempt of the House
because the Speech or Debate Clause protects “things generally done
in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the
38
business before it,” including voting. The Court next discussed the
39
Clause seventy-one years later in Tenney v. Brandhove, holding that
40
the predecessor statute to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not create civil
liability for acts done within the sphere of legitimate legislative
41
activity. It also observed that the Clause’s protection attaches—
42
when it attaches—absolutely. The Court later relied upon this
43
absolute protection in Dombrowski v. Eastland, holding that
legislators engaged “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity”
are protected “not only from the consequences of litigation’s results,
44
but also from the burden of defending themselves.” This absolute
protection would form the basis of the absolute testimonial privilege
45
upon which the D.C. Circuit based its decision in Rayburn.
B. The Bribery Cases
The substance of the circuit split between Rayburn and Renzi
largely stems from a series of prosecutions for bribery. These bribery
38. Id. at 204–05. This was not a necessary conclusion textually; the Court could have
construed the Clause’s protections to encompass solely words spoken in debate. Indeed, this
definition would seem to accord better with the deletion of the words “or proceedings” from the
text of Article IX of the English Bill of Rights. See Craig M. Bradley, The Speech or Debate
Clause: Bastion of Congressional Independence or Haven for Corruption?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 197,
206–10 (1979) (“[I]t is more reasonable to assume that the phrase [‘or proceedings’] was omitted
for the purpose of narrowing the privilege.”). But see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at
1130 (drawing no meaning from the omission of the word “proceedings” from the Clause).
39. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The predecessor statute was 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946).
41. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376, 379. William Brandhove, an unsuccessful mayoral candidate in
San Francisco, alleged that state legislators sitting on the California Legislature’s Senate FactFinding Committee on Un-American Activities had deprived him of due process and equal
protection by reading into the legislative record statements—including Brandhove’s “alleged
criminal record”—meant “to intimidate and silence [him] and deter and prevent him from
effectively exercising his constitutional righ[t] of free speech.” Id. at 371.
42. See id. at 377 (“The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the
privilege. . . . The holding of this Court in Fletcher v. Peck, that it was not consonant with our
scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has remained
unquestioned.” (citation omitted)). But see Note, The Bribed Congressman’s Immunity from
Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 340 (1965) (noting that applying the holding from Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810)—against questioning the motives of the legislature—does not
fairly apply to the motives of legislators).
43. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1966) (per curiam).
44. Id. at 85.
45. See infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
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cases largely defined the role of the Clause in interbranch
investigations and litigation, as the Court (1) interpreted the scope of
the Clause as providing an evidentiary privilege at trial, (2)
determined that investigations into bribery rest within the purview of
executive-branch scrutiny rather than solely congressional selfdiscipline, and (3) repeatedly declined to address whether Congress
might waive its Members’ privileges. The next three subsections
address each of these holdings in turn.
1. The Clause as an Evidentiary Privilege. The Court construed
the Clause as providing an evidentiary privilege in its first bribery46
related Speech or Debate Clause case, United States v. Johnson.
There, it held that Representative Thomas F. Johnson’s conviction
for accepting a payment in exchange for giving a speech on the House
floor was properly set aside, as a prosecution dependent on inquiries
into the “legislative acts” of the Member and his motives for
47
undertaking them necessarily violated the Clause.
48
Six years later, the Court in United States v. Brewster bounded
the scope of this evidentiary privilege, delimiting the definition of the
“legislative acts” protected in Johnson to include only “those things
generally said or done in the House or the Senate in the performance
of official duties and [inquiries] into the motivation[s] for those
49
acts.” It reasoned that a prosecution for bribery does not necessitate
any inquiry into legislative acts or their motivation, as taking a bribe
50
is not a legislative act. In the Court’s words, “To make a prima face
case [of bribery], the Government need not show any
act . . . subsequent to the corrupt promise for payment, for it is taking
the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal
51
act.”

46. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
47. Id. at 184–85. A Maryland savings-and-loan institution had allegedly paid the
Congressman to make a speech favorable to it, which it planned to distribute in print form to
allay the fears of potential investors. Though Representative Johnson’s criminal liability for his
related attempt to influence the Department of Justice to dismiss the pending indictments of the
savings-and-loan institution and its officers was not before the Court, id. at 171, 186 n.16, the
Court opined that the Clause would not protect conduct so unrelated to the “due functioning of
the legislative process,” id. at 172.
48. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
49. Id. at 512.
50. Id. at 526.
51. Id. This holding is consistent with the Court’s holding in Johnson. The Court’s inquiry
in Brewster was whether any case could possibly be made without contravening the Speech or
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2. The Role of the Executive Branch in Bribery Investigations.
Resolving the controversy in Brewster also required rejecting Senator
Daniel Brewster’s contention that alleged bribery was punishable
only by Congress—rather than by courts—in accordance with
52
Congress’s Article I, Section 5 power. Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Burger rebuffed this contention with two counterpoints.
First, he reasoned by analogy to the Court’s past construction of the
53
Arrest Clause that Members’ facing accountability for bribery solely
in nonjudicial forums would “render Members of Congress virtually
54
immune from a wide range of crimes.” Second, he pointed out that

Debate Clause, whereas its inquiry in Johnson had been whether the Speech or Debate Clause
had in fact been violated upon its review of Representative Johnson’s conviction. See supra note
47 and accompanying text.
52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member.”). A number of commentators have argued that investigations of and
punishment for bribery may only be carried out by Congress. See, e.g., Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The
Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. REV. 175, 183
(1973) (arguing that the Constitution requires that discipline of Members of Congress take place
within Congress or by recourse to the vote, rather than by process of criminal law). See generally
Alexander J. Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its
Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1 (1968). These arguments were effectively precluded by the Court’s strained historical analysis
in Brewster, discussed within. See infra note 54; cf. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 547 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]t does not follow that the Framers went further and authorized Congress to
transfer discipline of bribe takers to the Judicial Branch.”).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
54. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 520. A historical point is worth making here because the
distinction between the respective constitutional provenances of the Arrest Clause and the
Speech or Debate Clause matters to the analysis within. See infra Part III.C.I. Though the Court
recognized in Brewster “that the privilege against arrest is not identical with the Speech or
Debate privilege,” it nevertheless proceeded to reason from the arrest privilege by analogy
because, in the Court’s words, “[i]t can hardly be thought that the Speech or Debate Clause
totally protects what the [Arrest Clause] has plainly left open to prosecution, i.e., all criminal
acts.” Id. at 521.
This step is problematic: at least two reasons suggest that the privileges differ in
coverage. First, and most pragmatically, the two privileges were subject to entirely different
forms of abuse in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Compare THEODORE F.T.
PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD’S ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 196, 580 (11th ed.
1960) (noting parliamentary abuse of the privilege from arrest, which had extended to protect
“not only [Members’] persons, but their property, their servants, and their servants’ property,
and even to protect their game from poaching”), with Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516 (“[The speech or
debate privilege] has enabled reckless men to slander . . . others with impunity . . . .”). As
indicated below, these different forms of abuse led to circumscription of the privilege of arrest,
but not of the privilege of speech and debate. See infra notes 161–67 and accompanying text.
Second, and supporting the first point’s distinction between the privileges, is that the
two privileges are different in origin and served different functions historically. The arrest
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“[t]he [American] system of divided powers was expressly designed to
check the abuses England experienced in the 16th to the 18th
55
centuries.” Accordingly, in considering the Clause’s functional

privilege has roots in the old English curia regis, and it originally protected the king’s courtiers
in their travel to his side. See 1 WILLIAM R. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE
CONSTITUTION 156 (4th ed., reissue rev. 1911); PLUCKNETT, supra, at 196; 3 WILLIAM STUBBS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 512 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 5th ed. 1896). In
this regard, the arrest privilege was derivative of monarchical supremacy. The privilege of
speech and debate, on the other hand, was born in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in
the context of growing legislative power in the face of monarchical opposition. See PLUCKNETT,
supra, at 247–49, 319–27, 331–464. Thus, one might persuasively argue that the privilege of
speech and debate, but not the privilege of arrest, is properly the subject of solely legislative
construction. See supra note 52. The Court’s flawed analysis in failing to recognize these
differences between the privileges does not change the analysis within, however, which does not
question the Court’s conclusion that punishment and/or process for bribery should take place in
the courts rather than in Congress.
55. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 523. A further historical point is worth making here because it
reinforces a major thrust of the argument in this Note—that the Clause is important to
promoting democratic representation. Beyond failing to disaggregate the above two
components of English parliamentary privilege (the arrest privilege and the speech-and-debate
privilege), the Brewster Court supplemented its reasoning by attributing to Parliament’s judicial
origins Parliament’s power to judge the privileges of its own members. Id. at 518 (citing CARL
WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE, in OHIO ST. U. BULL., Aug.
30, 1921, at 1, 14).
This attribution glosses over disagreement regarding the origins of the speech-anddebate privilege. The historical account upon which the Brewster Court relied suggests that “the
idea that Parliament exercised and enforced its privileges as ‘the High Court of
Parliament’ . . . was firmly rooted for centuries in the minds of Parliament men, lawyers, and
judges, and prevailed to modern times.” WITTKE, supra, at 10. This viewpoint—that the
privilege is an “ancient and undoubted right, and an inheritance received from [Parliament’s]
ancestors,” see PLUCKNETT, supra note 54, at 357 (documenting this viewpoint and the
disagreement)—has been refuted. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1121 & nn.41,
44 (citing J.E. Neale, The Commons’ Privilege of Free Speech in Parliament, in 2 HISTORICAL
STUDIES OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT 147, 147–76 (E.B. Fryde & Edward Miller eds., 1970))
(noting and refuting this same argument that the privilege was judicial in nature and existed
since before the beginning of the reign of King Henry IV in 1399).
A proper understanding of the privilege focuses not on its purported judicial origins,
but instead on the privilege’s importance to democratic representation. The speech-and-debate
privilege grew with Parliament’s expanding legislative powers throughout the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. See infra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. The House of Commons’s
assertions of privilege throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries may indeed have
rested their justifications for the privilege in Parliament’s judicial nature. See, e.g., Proceedings
Against Sir John Elliot (K.B. 1629), in 3 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 293, 296 (London, R.
Bagshaw et al. 1809) (“Words spoken in Parliament, which is a superior court, cannot be
questioned in this court, which is inferior.”). As demonstrated elsewhere, however, these claims
by the House of Commons were aspirational. E.g., PLUCKNETT, supra note 54, at 249; see Neale,
supra, at 157–58 (documenting the earliest assertions of privilege and concluding that “[i]t is
clear that [Sir Thomas] More did not consider his petition a petition of right: free speech [was]
not yet a formal privilege”). To the extent the claims relied upon history, they were factually
inaccurate, revisionist accounts of the case of Member Richard Strode, who was convicted in a
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purpose of “preserv[ing] the independence and thereby the integrity
of the legislative process,” the Chief Justice reasoned that
“[d]epriving the Executive of the power to investigate and prosecute
and the Judiciary of the power to punish bribery of Members of
56
Congress is unlikely to enhance legislative independence.”
3. Refusal To Consider Waiver. As it had in Johnson, the Court in
Brewster declined to consider whether Congress might waive its
57
individual Members’ privileges by enacting the bribery statute. In
58
United States v. Helstoski, the Court refused once again to find a
waiver by Congress—in enacting the bribery statute—or by
Congressman Henry Helstoski, who had testified about the legislative
59
acts in question before a grand jury. This question of waiver is tied
to the constitutional propriety of executive-branch investigations and
prosecutions of Members: if Congress can waive its Members’
privileges, then perhaps only congressional approval is required
before the executive branch investigates a Member using techniques
that expose it to legislative-act materials.

local Stannary Court in 1512 of obstructing tin mining. PLUCKNETT, supra note 54, at 248–49.
The act annulling Strode’s conviction, Strode’s Act, 1512, 4 Hen. 8, c. 8, reprinted in 3 THE
STATUTES OF THE REALM 53 (photo. reprint 1963) (London, Dawsons of Pall Mall 1817), was
understood in 1512 to vindicate only the freedom of parliamentary speech from interference
from local tribunals, not to stand for any general principle of legislative privilege, PLUCKNETT,
supra note 54, at 249.
As noted elsewhere, this difference in the understanding of the origin of the privilege
has practical significance. See Lederkramer, supra note 17, at 470 (noting this conflict of
interpretation among commentators and that “[t]he dispute is not academic”). An ancient
judicial privilege might be discounted as a contingent peculiarity of English constitutional
history. Indeed, perpetuation of the Brewster Court’s flawed analysis in this regard has the
potential to affect the analysis of those commentators who would “weigh” or “balance” the
respective interests of the three branches of government by reference to the differing British
and American compositions of government. See, e.g., Harrell, supra note 9, at 410–12 (relying
on the Brewster Court’s analysis to discount “the English understanding of its legislative speech
protection”). Recognition that the privilege reflects democratic representation, rather than
judicial origins, precludes such summary distinction from the English legislative experience; the
American legislative experience, too, is one characterized by democratic representation.
56. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 524–25.
57. Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It appears that the first time the government
presented the argument ultimately adopted by the Court was in its Supplemental Memorandum
on Reargument. See Bradley, supra note 38, at 221 n.144.
58. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979).
59. See id. at 490–92. In Helstoski, the Court stated that waiver by a Member would require
“explicit and unequivocal renunciation of the [Clause’s] protection.” Id. at 491.
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C. The Oversight Cases
Prosecutions of Members of Congress also resulted in a series of
cases in which the Court defined the extent to which the Clause
protects Congress’s oversight function. These oversight cases are
significant in two regards. First, the Rayburn majority relied on the
60
Court’s holding in Gravel v. United States that the Clause
61
encompassed a testimonial privilege. Second, the oversight cases
secured congressional oversight as existing within the bounds of the
Clause’s core protected activities, thus providing protective space for
62
congressional investigations.
63
In Gravel v. United States and later cases—Doe v. McMillan and
64
Hutchinson v. Proxmire —the Court distinguished between
Congress’s claimed informing function and Congress’s oversight
function. The Court held in these cases that although the Clause
protects Members acting pursuant to the oversight function (including
Senator Mike Gravel’s reading the Pentagon Papers into the
65
Congressional Record ), it does not protect the publication of
66
classified materials to the public, defamatory comments in
67
constituent mailings, or the public distribution of congressional
68
reports. These “informing” activities are “political,” as they are not
part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the
69
legislative process. The basis for this distinction was the Court’s
distinction in Brewster between “purely legislative activities,” which
60. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
61. See id. at 616 (“We have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer—
either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution—for the events
that occurred at the subcommittee meeting.”).
62. Others have written about the constitutional values promoted by vigorous
congressional oversight; values including Congress’s very ability to legislate. See generally, e.g.,
Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 915;
Ervin, supra note 52.
63. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1972).
64. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
65. The Gravel prosecution resulted from Senator Gravel’s reading the Pentagon Papers
into the Congressional Record during a hastily convened meeting of the Senate Subcommittee
on Public Buildings and Grounds and his alleged arrangement for their publication by Beacon
Press. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 609. His efforts received relatively little attention due to the Supreme
Court’s decision the next day in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971),
protecting the New York Times’s publication of the Pentagon Papers.
66. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626.
67. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 132, 136.
68. Doe, 412 U.S. at 324–25.
69. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 132–33.
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the Clause protects, and “legitimate ‘errands’ performed for
constituents,” which it termed “political in nature rather than
70
legislative.” Congressional oversight of executive-branch agencies is
important to democratic representation, particularly in the face of
71
both expanding executive-branch power and the executive branch’s
72
increasing overclassification of information.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: RAYBURN AND RENZI
Rayburn and Renzi produced a split in authority among the
federal courts of appeal as to whether the Clause protects Members

70. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972). Harvey A. Silverglate, who
represented Senator Gravel in the Pentagon Papers litigation, and Professor Robert J. Reinstein
sharply criticize this aspect of the Court’s analysis, arguing that the Clause’s protections must
extend to a range of activities that reflects modern understandings of political representation,
rather than the static understanding at the time of the Clause’s adoption. See generally Reinstein
& Silverglate, supra note 16. Similarly, Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., wrote that the Court’s labeling
“political” activities “‘errands’ and assuming that they are performed for base political
reasons . . . demeans many legitimate acts performed by Congressmen in their representative
capacities.” See Ervin, supra note 52, at 186.
71. E.g., Reckless Justice: Did the Saturday Night Raid of Congress Trample the
Constitution?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 32–33 (2006)
[hereinafter Reckless Justice] (statement of Jonathan Turley, Professor, George Washington
University Law School).
72. Justice Douglas discussed this concern regarding overclassification in his Gravel
dissent:
The secrecy of documents in the Executive Department has been a bone of
contention between it and Congress from the beginning. . . . [A]s has been revealed
by such exposés as the Pentagon Papers, the My Lai massacres, the Gulf of Tonkin
“incident,” and the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Government usually suppresses
damaging news but highlights favorable news. In this filtering process the secrecy
stamp is the officials’ tool of suppression and it has been used to withhold information
which in “99½%” of the cases would present no danger to national security.
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 637, 641–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Many would argue that control over
and access to information has contributed to the expansion of executive-branch power. See, e.g.,
Ervin, supra note 52, at 191 (“Viewed in the context of the increasing difficulty that Congress
has in getting necessary information from the administration, [Gravel and Brewster] not only
limit the effective functioning of the legislative branch, but further increase the dominance of
the executive.” (footnote omitted)); see also Reckless Justice, supra note 71, at 32–33
(documenting the expansion of executive-branch power in the early 2000s); cf. ELIZABETH
GOITEIN & DAVID M. SHAPIRO, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, REDUCING
OVERCLASSIFICATION THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2011) (“Overclassification is a
perennial problem, and one that causes serious harm.”).
A possible counterargument to the possibility of impeding the oversight function is
simply that courts can cross that bridge when they reach it. Cf., e.g., Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The power to tax is
not the power to destroy while this Court sits.”). Impeding the oversight function, however, is
not a mere possibility: the bridge is arguably in the rearview mirror and fading fast. See infra
notes 223–24 and accompanying text. See generally Clark, supra note 62.
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from the executive branch’s compelling the disclosure of legislativeact material; that is, whether the Clause encompasses a
“nondisclosure privilege.” This Part outlines the facts of each case
and discusses how the D.C. and Ninth Circuits addressed whether the
Clause encompasses a “nondisclosure privilege.”
A. Congressman William Jefferson
1. The Facts in Rayburn. In March 2005, the FBI began
investigating Congressman William Jefferson, a nine-term
73
representative from Louisiana’s Second District, for bribery.
Jefferson, who served as the cochair of the Africa Trade and
Investment Caucus and the Congressional Caucus on Nigeria, was
suspected of both promising to undertake official acts on behalf of
business interests in the United States, Nigeria, and Ghana, and of
74
conspiring to bribe foreign officials. In a much-publicized aspect of
the investigation, a jilted investor-turned-informant approached
Jefferson wearing a wire and solicited his assistance in bribing a
Nigerian official with $100,000 cash, which Jefferson accepted and
75
placed in the trunk of his car. Days later, FBI agents raided
76
Jefferson’s car and his house in Washington, D.C., where they found
77
$90,000 in his freezer.
One notable detail in this initial search was the role played by
the House Office of General Counsel (House Counsel) in securing
Congressman Jefferson’s car, which the search warrant had indicated
78
would be parked at the Congressman’s house. When the FBI
determined that the vehicle was located in the garage of the Rayburn
House Office Building—within the Capitol Hill complex—FBI agents

73. United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 2012).
74. Id. at 335–36, 340.
75. E.g., Allan Lengel, FBI Says Jefferson Was Filmed Taking Cash, WASH. POST., May 22,
2006, at A1.
76. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the
U.S. House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae at 4, In re Search of the Rayburn House
Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C 2006) (N. 06-231 M-01).
77. Affidavit of Timothy R. Thibault at 10, In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg.,
432 F. Supp. 2d 100 (N. 06-23 M-01), available at http://www.npr.org/documents/2006/may/sw
_redacted.pdf. Ironically, while Jefferson and the informant passed notes back and forth to one
another over a dinner during which Jefferson solicited a kickback, he commented, “All these
damn notes we’re writing to each other as if we’re talking, as if the FBI is watching.” Id. at 21.
78. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, supra
note 76, at 4.
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and Capitol Police officers jointly secured the vehicle. The Capitol
Police notified House Counsel through the House Sergeant at Arms,
who then notified Jefferson, who ultimately cooperated with the
80
search.
On the same day as the raid, a grand jury issued a subpoena
duces tecum for documents in Congressman Jefferson’s office in the
81
Rayburn House Office Building. After Jefferson took steps to
82
preserve documents potentially responsive to the subpoena, House
83
Counsel arranged to secure those documents with Jefferson’s staff.
Six months later, as an appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit from the District Court for the Eastern District
84
of Virginia’s sealed ruling on Jefferson’s challenge to the subpoena,
the FBI applied to the District Court for the District of Columbia for
85
a search warrant for Jefferson’s Rayburn office. The affidavit in
support of the search warrant described special procedures designed
86
to safeguard materials protected by the Speech or Debate Clause:
most importantly, agents with no substantive role in the Jefferson
investigation were to conduct the physical search, after which a

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 4–5; see also 151 CONG. REC. 15, 20,448 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jefferson)
(notifying the House of his being served with a subpoena). For a discussion of the requirements
of Rule VIII of the House, which requires these announcements, see infra notes 188–94 and
accompanying text.
82. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal Advocacy Group,
supra note 76, at 5.
83. Id. The documents were locked in a drawer in the office of Jefferson’s Chief of Staff,
while emails were preserved by the office of the Chief Administrative Officer. Letter from Mark
D. Lytle, Assistant U.S. Attorney, to David Plotinsky, U.S. House of Representatives Assistant
Counsel, “Grand Jury Investigation 05GJ1318” (Sept. 16, 2005). That Jefferson’s Chief of Staff
controlled the items could be legally relevant, as such an arrangement would avoid a situation in
which the act of Jefferson’s compelled production would have testimonial significance. See
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 28 (2000). Yet, even if Jefferson himself controlled the
documents, to the extent that his control would have been in a custodial capacity, he almost
certainly would not have had a Fifth Amendment claim in the absence of an overbroad or
indefinite request. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 100 (1988); cf. United States v.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43–46 (2000) (affirming dismissal of an indictment on Fifth Amendment
grounds in the face of an overbroad subpoena because the defendant’s act of production had a
testimonial aspect).
84. This process, which took place under seal, would have occurred ex parte, but was
reported to the Washington Post under condition of anonymity. Shailagh Murray & Allan
Lengel, Return of Jefferson Files Is Sought, WASH. POST, May 25, 2006, at A1.
85. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
Affidavit of Timothy R. Thibault, supra note 77, at 72.
86. Affidavit of Timothy R. Thibault, supra note 77, at 74–82.
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“Filter Team” would review the files for responsiveness to the
warrant and “determine if they may fall within the purview of the
87
Speech or Debate Clause privilege.”
The District Court for the District of Columbia found probable
cause for the search warrant, directing the warrant to be executed
within three days and the U.S. Capitol Police to “provide immediate
88
access” to Congressman Jefferson’s office. The search occurred on
Saturday, May 20, 2006, and lasted eighteen hours, during which time
the FBI excluded from the office Jefferson’s personal counsel, House
89
90
Counsel, and the Capitol Police. Jefferson challenged the
constitutionality of the search warrant four days later, claiming that
the issuance and execution of the search warrant violated the Speech
91
92
or Debate Clause. The district court denied this motion, as well as
93
the Congressman’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal.
The D.C. Circuit immediately reversed the latter denial, requiring in
94
a remand order that the district court provide copies of the seized
materials to the Congressman, hear his privilege submissions ex parte,

87. Id. at 76. The noncase agents would also image the Congressman’s computer. Id. at 73–
74. The Filter Team was comprised of an Assistant U.S. Attorney, an attorney from the
Department of Justice, and a non-case agent from the FBI. Id. at 75–76. It was to provide a log
of “potentially privileged paper records” and a copy of the records to Jefferson’s counsel,
forwarding the originals to the district court for a determination of privilege; it was then to
return copies of the paper records it determined were nonprivileged to the Congressman while
forwarding the original paper records to the prosecution team. Id. at 77–78. The computer
image was to be forensically processed by the FBI using approved search terms, the results of
which would be reviewed by the Filter Team using the same procedure as for the paper files. Id.
at 76–82. This digital aspect of the search deserves commentary by someone with greater
technical expertise than I, and is thus outside the scope of this Note.
88. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 657.
89. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 106 (D.D.C.
2006), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
90. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal Advocacy Group,
supra note 76, at 7.
91. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 657. Jefferson filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(g) for the return of his property and an injunction against review of the seized
materials. Id. President George W. Bush immediately “directed the Attorney General, acting
through the Solicitor General, to preserve and seal the records” until July 9, 2006. Id.
92. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
93. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 658.
94. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., No. 06-3105 (D.C. Cir., July 28, 2006)
(remand order).
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and determine in camera which materials were “legislative in
95
nature.”
2. Congressman William Jefferson in the D.C. Circuit. Ruling
over a year after its interim remand order, the D.C. Circuit in United
States v. Rayburn House Office Building held that “the compelled
disclosure of privileged material to the Executive during execution of
96
the search warrant . . . violated the Speech or Debate clause.” The
search constituted “compelled disclosure” because it necessarily
involved and contemplated the executive branch’s exposure to
legislative materials, as “FBI agents had to review all of the papers in
97
the Congressman’s office.”
The majority reasoned that under D.C. Circuit precedent in
98
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, the Clause’s
testimonial privilege extends to protect written legislative-act
materials absolutely, and that this privilege includes a protection from
99
compelled disclosure. Accordingly, the search was unconstitutional
because it “denied the Congressman any opportunity to identify and
assert the privilege with respect to legislative materials before their
100
compelled disclosure to Executive agents.” The court denied
Jefferson’s requested recovery and—in an aspect of the case that is
easy to overlook but of central importance to understanding its
101
holding—it left its interim remand order in place, opining that the
appropriate accommodation of both the Speech or Debate protection
and the executive branch’s enforcement interests are “best
determined by the legislative and executive branches in the first
102
instance.”

95. Id. Following oral argument in this interlocutory proceeding in the D.C. Circuit, a
grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia returned a sixteen-count indictment against
Jefferson. Indictment, United States v. Jefferson, 562 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2008) (No.
1:07cr209), 2007 WL 1686486.
96. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 656. It also held that “the Congressman [was] entitled to the
return of documents that the [district] court determine[d] to be privileged under the Clause.” Id.
97. Id. at 661.
98. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
99. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 (“As ‘discovery procedures can prove just as intrusive’ as
naming Members or their staffs as parties to a suit . . . ‘a party is no more entitled to compel
congressional testimony—or production of documents—than it is to sue congressmen . . . .’”
(alterations and citations omitted)); see also infra note 122 and accompanying text.
100. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662.
101. Id. at 663. For a description of the order, see supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
102. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 663.
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Judge Henderson, concurring solely in the judgment,
challenged the majority’s reliance on Brown & Williamson, which had
upheld two Members’ challenge to a civil subpoena obtained by
private parties who sought files in possession of a congressional
104
subcommittee. She opined that Brown & Williamson had included
an internal constraint that “the Clause’s ‘testimonial privilege might
be less stringently applied when inconsistent with a sovereign
105
interest,’ such as the conduct of criminal proceedings.” Emphasizing
in a footnote that Congressman Jefferson had invoked his Fifth
106
Amendment right against responding to the earlier subpoena, she
reasoned that unlike a subpoena, the execution of a search warrant is
not unconstitutional “question[ing]” protected by the Clause because
107
it requires no affirmative response. In her view, “[T]o conclude that
the Clause’s shield protects against any Executive Branch exposure to
records of legislative acts would jeopardize law enforcement tools
108
that have never been considered problematic.”
B. Congressman Rick Renzi
1. The Facts in Renzi. Congressman Rick Renzi of Arizona
served on the House Natural Resources Committee, “the committee
responsible for, among other things, approving of any land-exchange
109
legislation before it can reach the floor of the House.” Ostensibly in
connection with this committee service, Renzi twice sought to induce
private parties seeking land-exchange deals to purchase property
103. Judge Henderson agreed with the majority’s judgment affirming the district court’s
denial of Congressman Jefferson’s Rule 41(g) motion, but she did “not agree with the majority’s
reasoning,” and sought to distance herself from what she considered to be its dicta. Id. at 667
(Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 421–23 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
105. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 671 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Brown
& Williamson, 62 F.3d at 419–20). Judge Henderson noted that the internal constraint in Brown
& Williamson was consistent with the Supreme Court’s observation in Gravel that “the Clause
‘does not purport to confer a general exemption upon Members of Congress’ from criminal
process.” Id. at 668 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626 (1972)).
106. Id. at 668 n.7; cf. supra note 83.
107. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 669 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1).
108. Id. at 671 (quotation marks omitted); see also In re Search of the Rayburn House Office
Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 110 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Carried to its logical conclusion, this argument
would require a Member . . . to be given advance notice of any search of his property . . . and
further that he be allowed to remove any material he deemed to be covered by the legislative
privilege prior to a search.”).
109. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2011) (footnote omitted). “Federal
land exchanges involve the exchange of privately held land for federal land.” Id. at 1016 n.4.
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owned by Renzi’s former business partner, James Sandlin, who owed
110
the Congressman money. At one point Renzi allegedly stated in
111
soliciting a bribe, “no Sandlin property, no bill.” Despite his alleged
112
promises, Renzi never introduced the land-exchange bill.
The government’s investigation of Congressman Renzi presented
multiple means of possible exposure to legislative-act materials: “[I]t
interviewed Congressman Renzi’s aides, reviewed documents
provided by those aides [without the Congressman’s consent],
wiretapped Congressman Renzi’s personal cell phone in accordance
with a Title III order, and searched, pursuant to a warrant, the office
113
of Patriot Insurance,” where the payments were made to Renzi. A
grand jury returned an indictment against Renzi charging “[fortyeight] criminal counts related to his land exchange ‘negotiations,’
including public corruption, charges of extortion, mail fraud, wire
114
fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy.”
2. Congressman Rick Renzi in the Ninth Circuit. In United States
v. Renzi, the Ninth Circuit considered, among other things, whether
the “district court erred by refusing to hold a Kastigar-like hearing”
regarding the government’s exposure to and reliance upon legislative115
act materials in obtaining indictments. Congressman Renzi’s appeal
on the issue, to be successful, would have required two conceptual
steps: First, it would have required the court to recognize an absolute
“nondisclosure privilege,” as the D.C. Circuit had in Rayburn, such
that the executive branch’s exposure to legislative-act materials would
116
constitute a violation of the Speech or Debate Clause. Second, it
would have required this “grandiose, yet apparently shy, privilege of
110. Id. at 1016–17.
111. Id. at 1030. The first time he simply offered to introduce the bill, whereas the second
time—“following the collapse of ‘negotiations’ with [the first party]”—he also offered the
second private party a “free pass” for the bill through the Committee. Id. at 1017. The second
party made a $1 million deposit to Sandlin, who used the money to pay his outstanding debts to
Renzi. Id.
112. Id. at 1018.
113. See id. at 1017, 1018 n.6.
114. Id. at 1018 & n.7.
115. Id. at 1032. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Supreme Court held
that the government may compel an individual’s testimony over a Fifth Amendment claim upon
granting use and derivative-use immunity. Id. at 462. At a so-called “Kastigar hearing,” the
government must prove that its case does not rely upon any evidence derived from the prior
compelled testimony. See Fifth Amendment at Trial, 38 ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 616, 632 &
n.1923 (2009).
116. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1033.
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non-disclosure that the Supreme Court has not thought fit to
117
recognize” to “preclude[] even the use of derivative evidence.”
The Ninth Circuit sided with Judge Henderson’s concurring
opinion in Rayburn, “disagree[ing] with both Rayburn’s premise and
118
its effect and thus declin[ing] to adopt its rationale.” It concluded
that “the Clause does not incorporate a non-disclosure privilege as to
119
any branch,” excoriating what it stated was the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning that “distraction alone serves as the touchstone for the
120
absolute protection of the Clause.” The court concluded that the
D.C. Circuit’s precedent—based on the protection of legislators from
121
“the burden of defending themselves” —conflicted with cases in
122
which the Supreme Court allowed exposure to legislative acts.
Despite explaining at great length its disagreement with the D.C.
Circuit as to the scope of the Clause, the Ninth Circuit disposed of the
case by holding that although some legislative-act evidence was
improperly presented to the grand jury, it did not cause the grand jury
to indict; rather, non-legislative-act evidence of bribed promises
123
caused the indictment.

117. Id. at 1032 & n.21. Note the alternative not taken: the court could have rested its
analysis having concluded that even if the Clause did encompass a “nondisclosure privilege,” it
would not preclude the derivative use of evidence obtained in violation thereof. See infra note
123; cf., e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (outlining avoidance principles).
118. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1034; see id. at 1037 n.28 (agreeing that the execution of a search
warrant “falls far short of the ‘question[ing]’ required to trigger the Clause” (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment)) (quotation marks omitted)).
119. Id. at 1039.
120. Id. at 1036 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 1035 (quoting Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) (per curiam)).
122. See id. at 1034, 1036–39. The Ninth Circuit zeroed in on the Rayburn court’s
“distraction” rationale by noting that it provided the only basis for the preclusion of civil
discovery in Brown & Williamson. Id. at 1034 (citing Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d 408, 418, 421
(D.C. Cir. 1995); MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir.
1988)). It reasoned that this aspect of the D.C. Circuit’s precedent extended the holding in
Eastland too far and that civil discovery is precluded only when the underlying civil action is
itself precluded. As such, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was unnecessary distraction, rather
than distraction alone, that was precluded in Eastland. Id. at 1034–35. For criticism of this aspect
of the court’s holding, see infra notes 153–54, 201–03 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 1031. The circuit split identified here largely concerns dicta. See supra note 117.
Accordingly, Renzi would not necessarily have come out differently on the analysis discussed in
Parts III and IV of this Note. The Ninth Circuit was probably right in implying that the Speech
or Debate Clause does not confer derivative-use immunity. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1032 n.21.
The Supreme Court has treated the Clause more like the Fourth Amendment than the Fifth
Amendment. It has applied the Clause’s evidentiary protection as a fairly narrow exclusionary
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***
Having discussed the Supreme Court’s Speech or Debate Clause
cases and the D.C. and Ninth Circuits’ opinions regarding whether
the Clause encompasses a “nondisclosure privilege,” this Note now
recasts Rayburn through separation-of-powers analysis, which will
underscore the limited nature of Rayburn’s holding and will situate
the case within the Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers
jurisprudence.
III. NONDISCLOSURE AS SEPARATION OF POWERS: A FORMALIST
READING
In deciding Rayburn, the D.C. Circuit faced a narrow question:
Does the executive branch or does Congress get to make a first
determination as to the applicability of the Speech or Debate Clause,
given that the executive branch has a law-enforcement interest in the
124
materials to be seized? This question is readily framed as one which
125
formalist separation-of-powers analysis can answer: Is one branch
126
exercising a power it does not have the authority to exercise?
This Part’s contribution to Speech or Debate Clause scholarship
is methodological. It analyzes the separation-of-powers claim without

rule, permitting prosecutions following the exclusion of any offending evidence, see supra Part I,
rather than requiring the government to meet anything comparable to the Fifth Amendment
Kastigar burden to avoid the exclusion of evidence. Cf. United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511,
516 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Determining whether evidence is tainted as the fruit of an unconstitutional
search or seizure or whether the taint is attenuated presents many of the same problems as
deciding whether the evidence used against [a defendant] is derived from . . . prior immunized
testimony. However, the two situations are distinguishable . . . . [I]t serves little deterrent
purpose to exclude evidence which is only indirectly and by an attenuated chain of causation the
product of improper police conduct.” (citations omitted)).
124. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(“The Executive acknowledges, in connection with the execution of a search warrant, that there
is a role for a Member of Congress to play in exercising the Member’s rights under the Speech
or Debate Clause. The parties disagree on precisely when that should occur and what effect any
violation of the Member’s Speech or Debate rights should have. The Congressman contends that
the exercise of his privilege under the Clause must precede the disclosure of the contents of his
congressional office to agents of the Executive . . . .” (emphasis added)). For a description of the
search procedure in Rayburn, see supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. The executive
branch’s competing interest is its duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3.
125. See supra note 30.
126. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (finding unconstitutional the
Article I Comptroller General’s exercising Article II powers); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76, 88 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (finding
unconstitutional an Article I court’s exercising Article III powers).
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127

falling back upon any “freestanding separation of powers principle.”
Instead, in considering whether the executive branch has the
authority to make the first determination as to the applicability of the
Speech or Debate Clause, this Part looks to the text of the Speech or
Debate Clause, judicial precedent construing the Clause, and past
interbranch practice. This methodology provides analytical content to
a claim that a Speech or Debate Clause case violates (or does not
violate) the separation of powers—or at least more analytical content
than simply claiming that any interbranch exercise of power violates
the separation of powers, or invoking the appropriate “balance of
128
powers.” Without concluding that Members have an absolute
“nondisclosure privilege,” this Part concludes that the Clause affords
Congress a right of prior assertion—that is, the right to assert its
institutional interests prior to the compelled disclosure of legislativeact material.
A. The Text
129

Turning first to the text, the only part of the Clause that might
on its face encompass a Member’s and/or Congress’s right to assert
legislative privilege prior to compelled disclosure is the Clause’s
prohibition on “question[ing].” Used as a verb in 1787, “to question”
had several possible meanings, including (1) “to enquire,” (2) “to
debate by interrogatories,” (3) “to examine one by questions,” (4) “to
doubt; to be uncertain of,” and (5) “to have no confidence in; to
130
mention as not to be trusted.” Definitions four and five do not fit
the Speech or Debate Clause, as Senators and Representatives would
not themselves be doubted “for any Speech or Debate in either
House;” and it is equally untenable to suggest that the Framers
constitutionalized a prohibition against the public’s losing trust or
confidence in their representatives. The other definitions have

127. See generally Manning, supra note 20. For a brief summary of Professor Manning’s
article, see infra Part IV.A.
128. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text.
129. For ease of reference, the text of Article I, Section 6 is reprinted here:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to
be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall
in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going
to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place.
130. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C.
Rivington et al. 6th ed. 1778).
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functionally identical meanings—the same dictionary defines
131
Together, these
“interrogatory” as “a question; an enquiry.”
definitions roughly approximate the following definition: “to examine
132
by interrogation.” Although this definition fits within the Speech or
Debate Clause framework, it does not identify the point in an
investigation at which this protection against examination by
interrogation first applies—that is, whether it applies at the point of
disclosure to investigators or whether it only applies at trial. Thus, the
plain meaning of the text does not reveal whether, during an
investigation, executive-branch officials may make the first
determination as to whether the Clause’s protection attaches.
The legal meaning in 1787 of the formulation “shall not be
133
questioned” is not particularly illuminating either. Most examples of
contemporaneous legal usage are inapplicable—for instance,
134
prohibitions on the questioning of legal instruments or the right to
135
bear arms. Other examples fail to resolve whether a prohibition on
questioning is solely a trial protection: Aside from Coffin v. Coffin,
which construed the Massachusetts analogue to the federal Speech or
136
Debate Clause, state courts used the formulation “shall not be
questioned” in reference to natural persons in two circumstances.
137
First, in Commonwealth v. Myers, the General Court of Virginia
construed a statute that read,
That if any person charged with any crime or offence against the
commonwealth shall be acquitted or discharged from further

131. 1 JOHNSON, supra note 130.
132. By comparison, the Supreme Court in Helstoski indicated that questioning has a
broader meaning than offering, and implied that the textual hook—the prohibition on
“question[ing]”—is triggered any time information about a legislative act is revealed. United
States v. Helstoski, 422 U.S. 477, 489–90 (1979).
133. See Harrell, supra note 9, at 396–97 (discussing contemporaneous usage and concluding
that “[t]hese usages fail to illuminate the Speech or Debate Clause’s original meaning”).
134. Several state cases employed the phrase “shall not be questioned” in reference to “the
validity of prizes,” Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 11 (1794), “legal title,” M’Nitt v.
Logan, 16 Ky. (1 Litt. Sel. Cas.) 60, 69 (1808), and the decisions of “a court of competent
jurisdiction in one nation . . . in the court of another,” Cheriot v. Foussat, 3 Binn. 220, 250 (Pa.
1810).
135. See KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 23 (1792), reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 33, at
1275 (“[T]he right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State shall not
be questioned.”); PENN. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 21, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 33, at
3101 (“[T]he right of citizens to bear arms, in defence of themselves and the State, shall not be
questioned.”).
136. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
137. Commonwealth v. Myers, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 188 (1811).

CARROLL IN PP CLEAN VERSION (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

1/27/2014 10:51 AM

2014] CONGRESS’S SPEECH OR DEBATE PROTECTION 1177
prosecution by the court of the county or corporation in which the
offence is or may by law be examinable, he or she shall not
thereafter be examined, questioned or tried for the same crime or
offence, but may plead such acquittal or discharge in bar of any
other or further examination or trial for the same crime or offence,
any law, custom, usage or opinion to the contrary in any wise
138
notwithstanding.

The wording of this statute indicates that questioning was not
solely a trial protection, as its use of the word “questioned” in a series
including “examined” and “tried” suggests that these words had
139
different meanings. Moreover, the Myers court referred in several
140
instances to “the examining court,” suggesting that “examination”
contemplates official judicial process. Thus, the court’s
pronouncement that “if his examining court discharges him, he can
141
never afterwards be questioned for the same crime” specifically
indicates that questioning would happen at an earlier procedural
posture in an investigation than would any official, in-court
examination.
Second, another series of cases stands for the principle that “[a]
judge shall not be questioned in a civil suit for doing, or neglecting, or
refusing, to do a particular official act, in the exercise of judicial
142
143
power.” The most illuminating of these cases is Yates v. Lansig,
which examined the concept of judicial immunity in some depth, and
concluded that the scienter of a judge undertaking judicial activities
“can never be averred or shown, but under process of
144
impeachment.” Yates is analogous to United States v. Johnson in
that it held that judges could not be responsible for—nor could
138. Act of Jan. 24, 1804, ch. 95, § 3, in 3 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 75 (Richmond,
Samuel Shepard 1836) (emphases added).
139. Cf. Chapman v. Turner, 5 Va. (1 Call.) 280, 287 (1798) (“It is an universal rule of
interpretation, that that construction shall be preferred which will reconcile and give effect to
the whole instrument without rejecting any part.”).
140. E.g., Myers, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 236.
141. Id. at 245 (emphases added).
142. Armstrong v. Campbell, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 259, 260 n.1 (1808); see Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day
315, 329 (Conn. 1804) (holding that “a judge is not to be questioned in a civil suit” “for error of
judgment, in doing an act . . . in the exercise of judicial power”); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282,
297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (ruling in favor of a chancery judge who, acting in his official capacity,
was alleged to have committed trespass in recommitting an individual to prison who had been
discharged upon habeas corpus, because judges neither were nor could “be responsible in civil
suit”).
143. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
144. Id. at 298.
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judicial inquiry be had into the motives for—actions undertaken in
145
the course of a judge’s judicial duties. It does not foreclose a
meaning of “to question” that encompassed pretrial protections.
Thus, contemporaneous legal usage does not speak to the meaning of
the word “question” in a way that resolves whether the legal meaning
of the verb “to question” encompassed a right to assert legislative
privilege prior to compelled disclosure during an investigation.
Nor do inferences from other parts of the Constitution help. The
formulation “shall not be questioned” also appears in the Fourteenth
146
Amendment, which was not ratified until 1868, and which denotes a
clearly inapplicable meaning of “treating a particular legal issue as
147
settled.” Although it is tempting to infer from the Clause’s
placement within Article I, rather than Article II, that it must be
within Congress’s sole function to make a first determination of
privilege, such reasoning fails to resolve the question at hand; this
structural inference speaks only to which branch the Clause protects,
rather than whether the Clause protects against compelled disclosure.
For the sake of argument, one might put aside the previous four
paragraphs’ analysis and assume that compelled disclosure to
investigators does not categorically fall within the Clause’s
prohibition of “question[ing],” such that investigators may “question”
Members. Even with this assumption in hand, the text of the Clause is
unclear as to whether investigators from the executive branch—as
opposed to legislative-branch officials—may question Senators and
Representatives, or whether they may question them in the House.
Put otherwise, whether questioning is permissible might depend on
who is doing the questioning and where, geographically, they are
doing it. The best possible argument proceeding from the assumption
that investigatory questioning is permissible might seek to infer that
the Clause’s prohibition on questioning Senators and Representatives
“in any other Place” should be read in conjunction with the prefatory
145. For discussion of Johnson, see supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. The New
York Supreme Court of Judicature indicated that judges could only be liable for actions taken
“in a mere ministerial capacity,” as such acts are “not . . . judicial act[s].” Yates, 5 Johns. at 297.
This reasoning is similar to the reasoning in Brewster, in which the Supreme Court held that
taking a bribe is not a legislative act. See supra note 49–50 and accompanying text.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4, cl. 1 (“The validity of the public debt of the United
States, authorized by law, . . . shall not be questioned.”). For mention of the inapplicability of
similar state-constitution provisions, see supra note 134.
147. Harrell, supra note 9, at 396; see id. at 397 (noting that such usage “fails to illuminate
the Speech or Debate Clause’s original meaning” because “the object of ‘shall not be
questioned’ is a legal concept, not a natural person”).
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clause’s “in either House,” leading to the conclusion that Senators
and Representatives may be questioned in either House. This is not a
necessary inference, however; the imperative phrase (“they shall not
148
be questioned in any other Place”) could very well stand alone. But
why did the Framers not write that “they shall not be questioned in
any Place” or simply that “they shall not be questioned” and thereby
avoid this confusion? A probable answer is that such phrasing would
conflict with Article I, Section 6, Clause 2, which allows questioning
of Senators and Representatives by each House—as opposed to
questioning by executive-branch officials—in punishing and/or
expelling its Members.
In sum, the Clause does not, on its face, speak to whether it is
constitutional for executive-branch officials to make a first
determination during an investigation as to its protections.
B. Precedent
Judicial precedent also does not resolve whether executivebranch officials may make the first determination during an
investigation as to the Clause’s applicability. As expressed by the
149
Court in United States v. Nixon, Congress and its Members do not
have the exclusive right to determine the scope of their own
150
privileges, as this would be inconsistent with judicial review. The
Court has not, however, spoken explicitly to whether the legislative
branch—rather than the executive branch—has the exclusive right to
determine the applicability of the Speech or Debate protection in the
151
first instance.
Whether the Supreme Court has implicitly held that nonlegislative officials may make first determinations as to the
applicability of the Clause merely begs the question of the Clause’s
scope. The Ninth Circuit reasoned in Renzi that the scope of the

148. Indeed, this is how the Court read the imperative phrase in Brewster, reasoning that in
adopting the proclamation of Coffin v. Coffin that “[a Member] is entitled to this
privilege . . . when not within the walls of the representatives’ chamber,” the Court in Tenney v.
Brandhove had construed the Clause to protect “legislative acts . . . which take place outside the
physical confines of the legislative chamber.” United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 514–15
(1972) (alteration in original) (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 28 (1808)).
149. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
150. See id. at 704 (“[T]his court has consistently exercised the power to construe and
delineate claims arising under [the Speech or Debate Clause] . . . .”).
151. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(concluding that there was no Supreme Court case on point).
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Clause could not include nondisclosure because the Supreme Court’s
152
past actions are inconsistent with a “nondisclosure privilege.” It
pointed to instances in which the Court required Members to turn
over legislative-act material, concluding that the Clause prohibits only
the introduction of legislative-act material at trial rather than the
153
disclosure of these materials to investigators. Yet the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning is based on a flawed premise: namely, it assumes an
inaccurate conception of the so-called “nondisclosure privilege.” If—
as this Note argues—the nondisclosure protection is solely Congress’s
right to assert privilege prior to compelled disclosure, rather than a
right of individual Members to do so, then contrary to the Ninth
Circuit’s assertion, the Clause does not “blindly preclude disclosure
and review by the Executive of documentary ‘legislative act’
154
evidence.”
In sum, judicial precedent does not resolve the constitutionality
of executive-branch officials’ making a first determination of the
Clause’s protections.
C. Past Practice
Unlike the text of the Clause and judicial precedent, past
interbranch practice speaks directly to the question of whether
executive-branch investigators may make the first determination as to
the Clause’s applicability. Reference to past practice to interpret
constitutional provisions can take the form of either reference to
practice at the time the Constitution was framed or to historical
155
This Section first refers to practice at the time the
gloss.
Constitution was framed, concluding that the Clause incorporates the
institutional protection of its English antecedent, Article IX of the
English Bill of Rights. It then considers historical gloss, which
indicates that the Clause’s institutional protection is one of
nondisclosure.
1. Past Practice as Codification. Questions of original meaning
often boil down to whether the text codified or modified historical
practice. In short, one might infer either that (1) the Speech or
Debate Clause modified contemporary practice at the time of

152.
153.
154.
155.

See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1037–39 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 1037.
E.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).
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ratification, or that (2) the Clause codified the ratifying generation’s
background understanding of legislative privilege, an understanding
informed by the English experience. In England, Parliament as an
156
institution controlled the speech-and-debate privilege. The scope
and understanding of the preratification parliamentary speech-anddebate privilege are probative of the meaning of the Speech or
Debate Clause—codifying this past understanding of institutional
control of the privilege—in the absence of contradictory evidence
157
from which to draw an inference of modification. At first glance, a
textual comparison of the Clause to Article IX of the English Bill of
Rights might appear to support a modifying inference, specifically in
158
the Clause’s omission of the word “proceedings.” As this Section
makes clear, however, the Framers’ intent of circumscribing
parliamentary privilege generally is not probative of their excising
from the English speech-and-debate privilege specifically its
institutional protection of the legislative branch—in the form of
nondisclosure—against the other branches.

156. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 23
(Washington, Joseph Milligan & William Cooper 2d ed. 1812) (“The privilege of a member is
the privilege of the House.” (citations omitted)); Bradley, supra note 38, at 223 (“The British
courts have always maintained ‘that the privilege of Parliament is the privilege of Parliament as
a whole and not the privilege in any individual member.’” (quoting Church of Scientology v.
Johnson-Smith, [1972] 1 Q.B. 522, 528)); see also JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED
FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS 5, 69–77 (2007) (characterizing the speech-and-debate privilege in England
before and at the time the U.S. Constitution was drafted as “Blackstonian” and “geographical”
in its protection of the institution of the House of Commons against outside interference);
Bernstein, supra note 17, at 660 (“When the monarch attempted to intrude into the legislature,
Parliament deployed its privilege as a shield; in times of more peaceful interbranch relations, the
private protection dominated.”).
157. The Supreme Court has often engaged in the same interpretive exercise briefly
undertaken here. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (“The text of the
Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation
requirement to be developed by the courts. Rather, the right . . . is most naturally read as a
reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions
established at the time of the founding.” (quotation mark omitted)); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 189, 202 (1880) (finding Parliament’s exercise of its contempt power irrelevant to
whether Congress possessed such power, as Congress “is in no sense a court,” but then
interpreting with regard to the Speech or Debate Clause that “it may be reasonably inferred
that the framers of the Constitution meant the same thing by the use of the language borrowed
from” the English Bill of Rights).
158. Article IX reads: “That the Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in
Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.”
1 W. & M. 2, c. 2, § 9 (1689) (Eng.), reprinted in 6 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note
55, at 143. For a discussion of the Framers’ omission of the word “proceedings,” see supra note
38.
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Article IX of the English Bill of Rights, which was adopted in the
wake of the Glorious Revolution, did not incorporate a privilege
unchanged since the early medieval period; rather, the privilege
codified as Article IX reflected changing social and political
159
circumstances.
Without recounting the entire clash between
parliamentary privilege and royal prerogative under the Tudors and
Stuarts, it suffices to note here that the speech-and-debate privilege
was of central importance to England’s realizing democratic
160
representation.
In the century following the codification of the speech-anddebate privilege as Article IX of the English Bill of Rights, Members

159. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1128–29. The account of legal historian
Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett paints a comprehensive picture of the connection between
parliamentary privilege and political power within a broader account of English constitutional
history. See generally PLUCKNETT, supra note 54. To summarize: Parliament’s eventual
assertion of the speech-and-debate privilege took place against the backdrop of, and
contributed to, a four-century ascendancy of representative government. During these
centuries, the House of Commons’s power and its role oscillated, as monarchs came to the
throne with different understandings of royal prerogative concerning matters of political
sensitivity—especially foreign affairs and religion. See generally id.
160. Professor Josh Chafetz advances this view in his book, Democracy’s Privileged Few. See
generally CHAFETZ, supra note 156.
Two key aspects of the history of the privilege merit emphasis here. First, the clashes
between privilege and prerogative overlapped substantively with the passing from the Crown to
Parliament of the initiative for instituting legislation concerning matters of national importance.
See PLUCKNETT, supra note 54, at 190 (noting the passing of the initiative from the government
to the governed via their representatives). The fact of the popularly representative House of
Commons initiating legislation would have been virtually incomprehensible to early English
monarchs, who originally called upon the third estate for the limited purposes of securing taxes,
loyalty during times of internal rebellion, and support for foreign conquest. See PLUCKNETT,
supra note 54 at 129, 133, 140–41, 145. Cf. generally Neale, supra note 55 (documenting the shift
from the practice of free speech under conditions of monarchical sufferance to the privilege of
free speech as right).
Second, these clashes also overlapped with the House of Commons’s emerging
understanding that its privileges were significant as a matter of political representation. See, e.g.,
SIMONDS D’EWES, THE JOURNALS OF ALL THE PARLIAMENTS DURING THE REIGN OF QUEEN
ELIZABETH 175 (London, Paul Bowes 1682) (“[H]e was not now a private man, but . . . person
and place of a multitude specially chosen . . . .”); PLUCKNETT, supra note 54, at 313 (“This
proceeding [the barring of William Strickland from attending Parliament in 1571] was noticed in
the House as being in violation of parliamentary privilege, and an injury not merely to himself
but to his constituents whom he represented.” (emphasis added)). This representation principle
also appeared in the Apology of the Commons. A Form of Apology and Satisfaction To Be
Delivered to His Majesty (1604), reprinted in J.R. TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF
THE REIGN OF JAMES I 217–31 (1931) (“[O]ur privileges and liberties are our right and due
inheritance no less than our very lands and goods . . . . [T]hey cannot be withheld from us,
denied, or impaired, but with apparent wrong to the whole state of the realm.” (emphasis
added)).
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of Parliament abused other aspects of legislative privilege, most
notably selling the benefits of their privilege from arrest and
161
systemically accepting bribes. These abuses were demonstrably
162
within the collective conscious of America’s founding generation.
Indeed, the colonists seized upon the 1763 prosecution for seditious
libel of John Wilkes—by some accounts, the sole Member of
163
Parliament who was not corrupt —as evidence of the dangers of
164
parliamentary overreach to democratic representation.
Many have taken the founding generation’s evident distrust of
the legislative branch as reason to construe the Speech or Debate
165
Clause narrowly. Yet the inclusion of the speech-and-debate
privilege in the Constitution stands in stark contrast with the other
privileges of Parliament, many of which—like the privilege from
arrest, the contempt power, the privilege to determine Members’
qualifications, and the privileges of exclusion and expulsion—were
166
either limited or excluded altogether. Indeed, that the privilege
survived strengthens the inference that the Framers intended to
narrow other privileges without changing the speech-and-debate
privilege, as “none of the abuses discussed [during the Convention]
was directly attributable to the free speech privilege, and none of the
reservations expressed by the Framers was applicable to that
167
privilege.”

161. See Bradley, supra note 38, at 210 (noting the myriad abuses of parliamentary
privilege).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 546 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing the prosecution of the English parliamentarian John Wilkes and noting that “the
Framers, aware of these abuses, were determined to guard against them”).
163. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527–28 (1969) (discussing the prosecution of
Wilkes and his subsequent campaign for reinstatement).
164. Bradley, supra note 38, at 221–22.
165. The ratifying generation undoubtedly aimed to guard against legislative excess. See
Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516–21 (construing the Clause narrowly by analogy to the privilege from
arrest); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 1, at 309 (“The legislative department is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex.”); Bradley, supra note 38, at 211 (“[I]t is . . . clear that a rather narrow view of legislative
privileges in general was the order of the day.”). For a discussion of the problems with this
aspect of the Brewster Court’s analysis, see supra note 54.
166. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1137.
167. Bradley, supra note 38, at 211; see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1139
(“[T]he fact that the other legislative privileges were curtailed gives no warrant to dilute the
speech or debate privilege, which had been molded by history as vital to the independence and
integrity of the legislature. The argument to the contrary . . . expressed by Chief Justice Burger
in Brewster[] depends upon an historical construction that is more creative than descriptive.”).
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Two aspects of the American Clause’s text seem particularly
problematic in the search for a textual hook for the preratification
understanding of an institutional nondisclosure protection. The lesser
problem is the Clause’s placement in Article I, Section 6, which lists
the privileges of and restrictions upon Senators and Representatives,
rather than in Article I, Section 5, which lists Congress’s institutional
prerogatives and requirements. This placement is ultimately of no
moment because Members only enjoy these privileges as Members of
Congress. As Thomas Jefferson noted: “The privilege . . . is restrained
to things done in the House in a Parliamentary course. For [the
Member] is not to have privilege contra morem parliamentarium, to
168
exceed the bounds and limits of his place and duty.”
The bigger problem is the shift from Article IX’s absolute
passive prohibition—that “Freedome of Speech and Debates or
Proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or
169
questioned” —to the apparent vesting of this protection in “Senators
170
and Representatives.” This change was made, without explanation,
171
in the Committee of Style and Arrangement. Yet one can infer from
a preliminary draft of the Clause that the specific limitation of
legislative privileges in Article I, Section 6 to “Senators and
Representatives” was directed at past abuses of the arrest privilege,
rather than at the speech-and-debate privilege. That draft reads:
Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall not be
impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of the
Legislature; and the members of each House shall, in all cases, except
treason[,] felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at Congress, and in going to and returning
172
from it.

This earlier draft of the Clause was adopted by the Convention
173
without contradiction. Notably, it leaves the speech-and-debate
privilege as a passive prohibition, whereas it specifically vests the
privilege from arrest in Senators and Representatives. Reading the

168. JEFFERSON, supra note 156, at 23–24 (citations omitted).
169. See supra note 158.
170. See supra note 9.
171. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 593 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1136 n.122.
172. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 171, at 180
(alteration in original) (emphasis added).
173. Id.
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Committee on Style and Arrangement’s change of the Clause as a
stylistic revision, rather than a substantive one, is consistent with the
174
limits upon that Committee’s authority. It also makes sense given
that parliamentary abuse of the arrest privilege involved its extension
175
beyond Members. Of course this reasoning is speculative, as the
only recorded debate on the Clause involved two proposals—one
from Charles Pinckney and the other from James Madison—neither
176
of which was adopted. As noted elsewhere, though, “The Supreme
Court has relied expressly on this limitation on [the] authority [of the
Committee on Style and Arrangement] when interpreting the text of
177
the Constitution.”
***
Given the absence of compelling contradictory evidence from
which to draw an inference of modification, it seems that the Speech
or Debate Clause is best thought of as codifying the institutional
protection of its English antecedent. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
never recognized the privilege as vesting in legislators rather than in
178
Congress, and the distinction between legislators’ and legislative
privilege appears to have held salience with the founding

174. The Committee on Style and Arrangement lacked authority to substantively change the
Constitution’s draft provisions. Id. at 553; Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 279, 288 (1998).
175. Members extended the arrest privilege to protect their property and servants and sold
“protections” to “complete outsiders.” Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 16, at 1137 n.128; see
supra notes 54, 161 and accompanying text.
176. Lederkramer, supra note 17, at 470.
177. Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, the Hamilton Affair, and Other
Constitutional Mythologies, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 1791, 1813 n.99 (1999) (citing U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 792 n.8 (1995); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 538–39 (1969)).
178. The Supreme Court stated in dicta in Gravel v. United States that the Speech or Debate
Clause was the “privilege of the Senator, and invocable only by the Senator or the aide on the
Senator’s behalf,” but it did so in the course of considering whether the Clause’s protections
extend to a Senator’s aide when the Senator would be protected by the Clause. Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 622 (1972). Similarly out of context is the statement of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Coffin v. Coffin:
[I]t appears . . . that the privilege secured by [the Massachusetts Constitution’s speech
or debate provision] is not so much the privilege of the house . . . as of each individual
member composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even against the declared will
of the house. For he does not hold this privilege at the pleasure of the house, but
derives it from the will of the people . . . .
Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass 1, 19 (1808). Professor Craig Bradley notes that Coffin is “an
ambiguous precedent at best,” Bradley, supra note 38, at 223 n.156, and the Supreme Court has
never adopted this language from Coffin in construing the federal Speech or Debate Clause.
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179

generation.
Moreover, the Clause was written at a level of
180
generality that allowed for tailoring to the American experience.
The ensuing historical gloss evinced this tailoring in action.
2. Past Practice as Historical Gloss. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly made reference to historical gloss in deciding separation181
of-powers cases. Independent of its potential relevance in ordinary
questions of constitutional interpretation, the history of past
accommodation between two branches has special significance in the
separation-of-powers context as evidence of the two branches’ settled
182
understanding of where a constitutional line lies. Reference to past
practice indicates that “since the first service of a subpoena for
documents by the executive branch on a House committee,” Congress
has reserved the right to make an “initial determination of the Speech

179. For instance, the Virginia Constitution of 1776 provided, “That no man, or set of men,
are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in
consideration of public services . . . .” VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 4, reprinted in 7
THORPE, supra note 33 at 3813. Similarly, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided, “No
man . . . ha[s] any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges distinct
from those of the community, than what rises from the consideration of services rendered to the
public . . . .” MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. VI, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 33, at 1890.
Though further consideration of colonial parliamentary practice is outside the scope of this
Note, it is discussed in greater detail in Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the
Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221 (2003).
180. Thus, the level of generality at which the Convention adopted the Clause—as with
other generally worded clauses in the Constitution—reflects a compromise to defer certain
constitutional questions to future generations. See Manning, supra note 20, at 1945 (“Like many
bargained-for texts, the Constitution’s structural provisions . . . leave many important questions
unanswered.”); cf. Lederkramer, supra note 17, at 471 (“The framers, by rejecting the proposals
of Madison and Pinckney, chose to fashion a loosely defined privilege and to leave its
construction to the courts, not Congress.”). This Note does not follow the assumption that the
courts must define all aspects of the boundary between the executive and legislative branches.
Cf. Manning, supra note 20, at 1974 (“[R]espect for legislative supremacy requires interpreters
to hew closely to the level of generality at which Congress has spoken.”); H. Jefferson Powell,
The Province and Duty of the Political Departments, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 365, 379 (1998) (“It
is . . . the province and duty of the political departments, within their respective spheres, to say
what the law of the Constitution is.”).
181. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (“Traditional ways of
conducting government . . . give meaning to the Constitution.” (quotation mark omitted));
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the
words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”).
182. See Youngstown, 342 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he way the
framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according to its true
nature.”).
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or Debate privilege . . . subject to court review.” This history
suggests that legislative independence is not coterminous with
legislators’ independence—and it is the former, rather than the latter,
that requires absolute protection.
The executive branch did not first seek to compel the production
of documents from Congress until 1876, when it sought documents
from the Committee of the House of Representatives on
Expenditures in the War Department relating to the Committee’s
184
investigation of Secretary of War William Belknap for bribery.
Upon that Committee’s notification to the House that it had complied
with the subpoena, the House, after a lengthy debate, resolved that
such compliance absent its approval was in breach of the House’s
185
privilege. Later that month, Members notified the House of their
receipt of a grand jury summons, prior to seeking the House’s consent
186
Thus developed the practice,
to comply with the summons.
acquiesced in by the executive branch for the next one hundred years,
that “subpoenas for documents . . . or testimony . . . could be
complied with only by permission of the House by passage of a
187
resolution to that effect.”
188
The House modified this practice in 1977, clarifying its
procedures three years later in a precursor resolution to Rule VIII of

183. Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Jack H. Maskel & Todd B. Tatelman,
Legislative Attorneys, Cong. Research Serv., Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by
Executive Branch Searches of Legislative Offices 13 (June 13, 2006), available at
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/Jefferson%20GD%20Memo.pdf. Others have written on
this subject at greater length. See generally, e.g., David Kaye, Congressional Papers, Judicial
Subpoenas and the Constitution, 24 UCLA L. REV. 523 (1977) (concluding that the House’s
institutional interest in approving requests for documents is only in protecting the original
copies).
184. 3 A. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 2661 (1907).
185. See id. (“Whereas the mandate of said Court is in breach of the privilege of this House:
Resolved, that the said committee and the members thereof are hereby directed to disregard
said mandate until the further order of this House.”).
186. Id. § 2662. This practice accorded with the House’s decision in 1846 not to grant
Members a blanket permission to comply with subpoenas ad testificandum, but rather to grant
permission to the Representative in the instant situation. Id. § 2660.
187. Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Jack H. Maskel & Todd B. Tatelman, supra
note 183, at 13, 14–16
188. H.R. Res. 10, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 73 (1977) (enacted). This procedural
modification did not change the House practice of making a first determination in applying its
privilege. See Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Jack H. Maskel & Todd B. Tatelman,
supra note 183, at 16–17.
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the House. Rule VIII requires a Member to notify the Speaker of
the House upon the receipt of a subpoena and the Speaker to lay such
190
notification before the House. After this,
the Member . . . shall determine whether the issuance of the judicial
or administrative subpoena or judicial order . . . is a proper exercise
of jurisdiction by the court, is material and relevant, and is consistent
with the privileges and rights of the House. Such Member . . . shall
notify the Speaker before seeking judicial determination of these
191
matters.

As noted elsewhere, “The second notification . . . provides the
institution the opportunity to adopt a resolution prohibiting the
192
release of the documents or testimony to be taken.” Indeed, the
Rule requires that a “Member . . . shall comply with the . . .
193
subpoena” except as “otherwise ordered by the House,”
a
requirement that also contemplates the possibility of Congress
adopting a resolution prohibiting disclosure. This understanding is
not limited to Congress—the U.S. Attorney’s Manual also
194
acknowledges the practice.
These changes initiated in 1977 corresponded with the shift from
Congress’s representation in litigation by the Department of Justice
195
to the development of House and Senate Counsels Offices in 1977

189. H.R. Res. 722, 96th Cong., 126 CONG. REC. 25,777 (1980) (enacted). This resolution
was adopted as Rule L of the House Rules, H.R. Res. 5, 97th Cong., 127 CONG. REC. 98 (daily
ed. Jan. 5 1981), which itself was subsequently recodified, H.R. Res. 5, 106th Cong., at 23 (1999),
as Rule VIII of the House Rules. THOMAS J. WICKHAM, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S
MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 112-161, at 408
(2013).
190. For an example of the pro forma notification the rule generates, see 151 CONG. REC.
20,448 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jefferson).
191. WICKHAM, supra note 189, at 409 (emphasis added).
192. See Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Jack H. Maskel & Todd B. Tatelman,
supra note 183, at 18.
193. WICKHAM, supra note 189, at 410 (emphasis added).
194. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL: TITLE 9, CRIMINAL RESOURCE
MANUAL § 2046 (rev. ed. 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02046.htm. For further documentation of the executive
branch’s acquiescence in Congress’s maintenance of a right of prior assertion of privilege, see
generally David Kaye, Congressional Papers and Judicial Subpoenas, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 57
(1975). Professor David Kaye concludes that Congress has a valid claim of absolute privilege as
to the production of its original papers. Id. at 76.
195. See generally Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of
Representing in Court the Institutional Client, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1998)
(documenting the shift to institutional representation in the House and Senate).
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and the establishment of those offices in the following two years. In
the preceding decade, Congress’s institutional interests frequently
diverged from those of the executive branch, as the executive branch
resisted with increasing frequency the investigative demands of
197
congressional committees and prosecuted several Members of
198
Congress. That Congress—in altering its procedures during a time
when its institutional interests were at the forefront of its concerns—
explicitly reinforced its understanding of its prerogative to make the
first determination of privilege lends additional support to such a
right falling within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause. When
Congress takes specific action to guard its prerogatives, these actions
199
have real, constitutional importance, especially given the executive
branch’s continued acquiescence in that understanding—continued,
that is, from the 1800s until 2006.
***

196. Congress statutorily created the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, Ethics in
Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 701, 92. Stat. 1824, 1875 (1978) (codified as amended at
2 U.S.C. § 288–288n (2012)), whereas “[h]istorically, the functions of the House General
Counsel were performed by the Counsel to the Clerk of the House,” whose position was
“renamed House General Counsel in 1979,” MATTHEW E. GLASSMAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE, RS22890, HOUSE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL 1 (2008). For a discussion of the
differences between the House and Senate Legal Counsel offices, see generally Tiefer, supra
note 195. In particular, the offices differ in their approaches to criminal matters. Id. at 59–60.
The statutory authorization of the Office of Senate Counsel provides only for the Office’s
representation of Senators in civil actions. 2 U.S.C. § 288c (2012). The Senate office, however,
may appear (and has appeared) “in criminal matters by representing document custodians and
staff witnesses, or by representing the institution or its leadership as amici.” Tiefer, supra note
195, at 59 n.60; see also S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 88, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4301
(“[T]he Counsel may be directed to defend [Senators] if the case is civil or criminal in nature
but only if the subpoena arises from the performance of official duties.”). The office has
appeared as amicus in support of at least one Senator’s defense of a criminal matter. Tiefer,
supra note 195, at 60 n.65 (citing United States v. Durenberger, No. 3-93-65, 1993 WL 738477
(D. Minn. Dec. 3, 1993)). House Counsel has generally been much more willing to represent the
House’s institutional interests in criminal proceedings. See id. at 59–60.
197. See Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Jack H. Maskel & Todd B. Tatelman,
supra note 183, at 20–22.
198. See supra Parts I.B–C. See generally, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 (2008).
199. Here, Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison’s article, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012), provides theoretical support. The article
incorporates political science scholarship into the professors’ reconceptualization of
“acquiescence”-based separation-of-powers arguments, concluding with regard to executivecongressional agreements that putative congressional acquiescence in executive actions should
receive less weight due to the shortcomings of the Madisonian model of interbranch relations. It
stands to reason that the inverse should be true, too—that executive-branch acquiescence in
congressional actions and practices should receive greater weight.
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Historical gloss suggests that the legislative branch, not the
executive branch, has the sole authority to make a first determination
as to the applicability of the protections of the Speech or Debate
Clause. This ultimately is a question of the Clause’s scope, but not as
200
framed in United States v. Renzi. The question is not whether the
scope of the clause encompasses an absolute privilege against any
compelled disclosure, but is rather a question of procedure—
Congress, not the executive branch, gets to make first determinations
as to privilege.
D. Normative Considerations Support the Formalist Analysis
This tentative conclusion is supported by normative
considerations. The Clause’s nondisclosure protection is not designed
to safeguard legislators’ independence. The Renzi court’s
characterization of the Rayburn holding—which it described as
resting upon nothing more than a “distraction rationale” hinged upon
201
the word “question” and D.C. Circuit precedent—missed the point.
Any court should discount a nondisclosure rule that is based solely on
avoiding legislators’ distraction.
202
Instead, the Clause protects democratic representation. As in
other separation-of-powers contexts, the Clause’s institutional
203
protection focuses on practical control. Recognition that the Clause
provides an institutional protection will ultimately be determinative of
whether investigations of congressional criminality take place via
subpoenas, which preserve the congressional right of prior assertion,

200. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1033 (9th Cir. 2011) (framing the Clause’s
“nondisclosure privilege” as an extension of a Member’s testimonial privilege).
201. For a description of this aspect of the D.C. Circuit’s holding, see supra note 122.
202. Legislative independence is not primarily constitutionally valuable as an end in itself;
its value is the instrumental role it plays in fostering democratic representation. See, e.g., Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969) (“[The Clause] ensures that legislators are free to
represent the interests of their constituents without fear that they will later be called to task in
the courts for that representation.”); see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972)
(discussing the public’s right to honest representation). For historical evidence supporting this
point, see supra note 55.
203. Compare Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972) (“Rather than giving the
Clause a cramped construction the Court has sought to implement its fundamental purpose of
freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control
his conduct as legislator.”), with Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1985) (holding that the
Comptroller General is part of the executive branch, rather than the legislative branch, because
he is removable by Congress, and that “to permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an
officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over
the execution of the laws”).
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or via searches, which do not. To vest in the legislative branch a
privilege to protect it from the other branches while at the same time
allowing the executive branch to make an initial determination about
which materials the privilege protects fatally undermines that
protection, regardless of whether executive-branch officials are acting
in good faith. Although a filter team’s presumptive determination of
the applicability of the Clause might accommodate valuable
executive-branch and constituent interests—among them effectively
205
combatting corruption —“the Framers ranked other values higher
206
than efficiency.” Moreover, as this Note proceeds to discuss,
executive-branch searches—even those using filter teams—differ
functionally from subpoenas in important ways.
IV. NONDISCLOSURE AS SEPARATION OF POWERS: A (MODIFIED)
FUNCTIONALIST READING
A formalist rationale suffices to resolve the easier case
(Rayburn): the executive branch cannot determine the applicability of
207
the Speech or Debate Clause in the first instance. Formalist
reasoning is insufficient, however, to resolve the issue presented in
Renzi and future investigations of congressional criminal wrongdoing:
namely, how to accommodate “law enforcement tools ‘that have
208
never been considered problematic’” given the executive branch’s
Article II, Section 3 interest to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.” The Clause does not exempt Members from criminal
209
responsibility generally,
and discerning the line at which
congressionally determined procedural prerequisites become de facto

204. As noted in Judge Henderson’s Rayburn concurrence, rejecting a nondisclosure
protection would favor executive-branch searches over subpoenas, as searches avoid the active
response that triggers the Clause’s prohibition on questioning. United States v. Rayburn House
Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
205. See Harrell, supra note 9, at 404–08 (arguing that a “Corruption Principle,” similar in
constitutional value to federalism, tips the scales in favor of reading out of the Court’s
jurisprudence that the Clause encompasses any evidentiary privilege). For further discussion of
a corruption principle, see Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 341, 342 (2009).
206. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); see Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998) (“[F]ailure of political will does not justify unconstitutional
remedies.”).
207. See supra Part III.
208. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rayburn, 497 F.3d
at 671 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment)).
209. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626 (1972).
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substantive immunity under the auspices of protecting legislative
independence is the realm of pure functionalism.
This Part demonstrates that functionalist separation-of-powers
analysis—as reconceived in Professor John Manning’s article
Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation—reaches the same
conclusion as the above formalist analysis on the facts in Rayburn,
before applying functionalist analysis to Renzi. It first summarizes
Professor Manning’s contribution to the understanding of
210
then outlines the
functionalist separation-of-powers analysis,
legislative interests courts might weigh against the executive branch’s
“take care” interest. Next, it highlights the role of the governmental
branches relative to one another, before concluding that interbranch
accommodation is best left to Congress and the executive branch in
the first instance.
A. The Functionalist Argument
In Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, Professor
Manning argues that a freestanding separation-of-powers principle
211
cannot negate ordinary means of constitutional interpretation. This
means that in interpreting the Constitution, courts should apply
principles of statutory interpretation, like “the specific controls the
212
general,” rather than rule on the basis of separationist or balance213
of-powers theories of the separation of powers. Manning reasons
from a view of the Constitution as a series of political compromises
made during the Constitutional Convention, some of which are very
specific. He argues that courts should respect not only these specific
compromises—like the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses,
which “carefully divide statutemaking power among three
214
institutions” —but also the Constitution’s indeterminacies, which
evince a decision to leave certain determinations to future

210. Though I am confident that Professor Manning does not consider himself to be a
functionalist, that does not mean that his contributions cannot be appropriated to inform
functionalist separation-of-powers theory. See generally Peter L. Strauss, A Softer Formalism,
124 HARV. L. REV. F. 55 (2011).
211. Manning, supra note 20, at 1944.
212. See id. at 2008–11 (citing the decisions in Chadha and Bowsher as following this
principle, as the outcomes were dictated by the specifics of Article I, Sections 1 and 7 and
Article III, Section 1, rather than the general Necessary and Proper power).
213. For examples of “balance-of-powers” rationales, see supra notes 20–21.
214. Manning, supra note 20, at 1982.
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generations; determinations to be made by Congress pursuant to the
215
Necessary and Proper power.
The Supreme Court’s test for functionalist separation-of-powers
claims is whether a challenged action potentially prevents a branch of
government from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions without that adverse impact being justified by an overriding
need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of
216
another branch. It is, on its face, a balancing test. Incorporating
Professor Manning’s insights makes clear, however, that proper
functionalist separation-of-powers analysis does not simply balance
interests; it also considers whether this balancing is more
217
appropriately done by courts or by Congress.
B. The Interests at Stake in Rayburn
Turning to the interests at stake in Rayburn, searches of
congressional offices compel access to legislative-act material
immediately rather than in the due course of a subpoena response.
This does more than merely distract legislators, the sole functionalist
218
concern acknowledged by the Renzi court. Searches also (1) deter
legislative candor, (2) impede the oversight function, and (3)
circumvent Congress’s institutional role.
1. Deter Legislative Candor.
The prospect of compelled
disclosure of legislative-act material will deter legislators—including
those who themselves will never become the target of
investigations—from documenting or expressing their opinions with
219
candor, especially those opinions that are not politically popular.

215. See supra note 180.
216. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (distilling this
constitutional test from United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
217. Cf. Manning, supra note 20 at 1975 (“[W]hen a court abstracts from the specific to the
general, the level of generality at which it enforces statutory policy reflects judicial, and not
legislative, choice.”).
218. Cf. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (characterizing Rayburn
as based solely on a distraction rationale); supra note 122.
219. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 (“Human experience teaches that those who expect public
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for
their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”). It is beyond the scope of
this Note to document exactly how much of this exchange of ideas takes place in writing, or to
hypothesize whether the prospect of easier or more difficult executive-branch exposure to
legislative-act material might lead to media shifting (perhaps to verbal-only communication),
and whether this would be good or bad for democratic representation.
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This basic deterrence effect is compounded because executive-branch
officials are often in no position to know what is or is not legitimate
legislative activity, and thus will, even in the best of faith, fail to
identify legitimate legislative-act materials, resulting in false
220
positives. A right of prior assertion resting solely in the individual
Member whose office is being searched will not mitigate this
deterrence, because an individual Member is likely to systematically
discount the value of protecting legislative materials not pertaining to
221
her own conduct.
2. Impede the Oversight Function. Compelled disclosure of
legislative-act material is incompatible with Congress’s oversight
function, as Congress may be investigating the very agency
222
conducting the search. This nearly occurred in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks, when the FBI began investigating possible
leaks from the two congressional intelligence committees, which in
turn were investigating “possible mistakes made by the U.S.
223
intelligence agencies, including the FBI, CIA and NSA.” A possible
constitutional crisis was avoided by the Department of Justice’s
working with both Congressional Counsels in developing a request
procedure to protect Congress’s right to prior assertion of the Speech
224
or Debate privilege. As it becomes increasingly difficult to obtain

220. For example, House Counsel may be called on to respond to a subpoena seeking what
would look like nonprotected material to a neutral third party. In one instance, “House Counsel
represented a Member who, because of a personal family tragedy, had developed a legislative
interest in a particular drug.” Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal
Advocacy Group, supra note 76, at 30 n.21. After screening each document in the
Congressman’s possession, House Counsel determined that all but a “handful” of the
documents were protected legislative-act material; the unprotected materials included “press
releases and communications with federal regulatory agencies unrelated to the legislative
process.” Id.; see also Huefner, supra note 21, at 324 (suggesting the possible harm to other
Members and to the House as an institution from inquiry into documents peripherally related
to—but not part of—Congressman Jefferson’s alleged corruption).
Offsetting this deterrence mechanism does not require what some have argued is a
corollary protection, requiring that the legislature determine the scope of its own privilege
and/or punish Members within its Article I, Section 5 power. See supra note 52. It does,
however, require that Congress have the right to prior assertion.
221. See Tiefer, supra note 195, at 59–62 (noting that the interests of Congress as an
institution and those of its members often diverge during investigations).
222. For a discussion of the oversight function, see supra Part I.C.
223. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Bipartisan Legal Advocacy Group,
supra note 76, at 32–33.
224. Id.
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classified information from the executive branch, such protective
space for congressional investigations is of increasing importance to
ensure that the executive branch remains politically accountable and
that Congress is able to access the information it needs to fulfill its
226
constitutional responsibilities.
3. Circumvent Congress’s Institutional Role. Despite the above
problems, one might argue that, in terms of the balance of powers
between branches, executive-branch searches of congressional offices
using filter teams are not functionally different than congressional
prior assertion in response to subpoenas. One might even argue for
their superiority, as searches might enhance legislative independence
while furthering the executive-branch interest in policing
227
corruption. The formalist objection to this argument is that such
228
balance-of-power considerations simply do not matter. Even in
functionalist terms, however, such searches are emphatically not the
functional equivalent of subpoenas. Searches for documents render
ineffective Congress’s ability to retain institutional control over its
materials in the face of a subpoena, and they grant access to the

225. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
226. Congress often needs to access information from the executive branch in order to carry
out its constitutional responsibilities, including its responsibility to legislate. See supra note 62.
227. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he ability of the
Executive to adequately investigate and prosecute corrupt legislators for non-protected
activity . . . is of paramount importance to the Legislative branch itself, . . . [as] ‘financial abuses
by way of bribes, perhaps even more than Executive power, would gravely undermine
legislative integrity and defeat the right of the public to honest representation.’ . . . Were we to
join the D.C. Circuit . . . we would thus only harm legislative independence.” (quoting United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524–25 (1972))); cf. Harrell, supra note 9 at 405 (arguing for an
“anti-corruption principle”). For a further discussion of whether prosecution or immunity best
protects legislative independence, see generally Simon Wigley, Parliamentary Immunity:
Protecting Democracy or Protecting Corruption?, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 23 (2003).
228. See supra note 206 and accompanying text; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945
(1983) (“[P]olicy arguments supporting even useful ‘political inventions’ are subject to the
demands of the Constitution which defines powers and . . . sets out just how those powers are to
be exercised.”). The formalist might also note that functionalist concerns—if they are
appropriate at all—are secondary to formalist analysis; thus, one does not even get to balancing
legislative independence against executive-branch enforcement interests. The Supreme Court
has suggested that although formalist and functionalist separation-of-powers analyses are not
mutually exclusive constitutional arguments, formalist analysis has lexical priority. See Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (“[B]ecause we conclude that the Act’s
cancellation provisions violate [the Presentment requirement], we find it unnecessary to
consider the District Court’s alternative holding that the Act ‘impermissibly disrupts the balance
of powers among the three branches of government.’” (quoting City of New York v. Clinton,
985 F. Supp. 168, 179 (D.D.C. 1998))).
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legislative-act materials of other Members and of congressional
committees without the benefit of institutional participation in the
229
adversarial process.
***
Given these interests, the Ninth Circuit was clearly incorrect in
its claim that “Rayburn rests on the notion that . . . distraction alone
can . . . serve as a touchstone for application of the Clause’s
230
testimonial privilege.” Rayburn would come out the same under
functionalist analysis as under formalist analysis because searches of
congressional offices potentially prevent the legislative branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions, and the impact
is not justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
231
executive branch’s own constitutional authority.
A possible objection to this conclusion is that a partisan
Congress might interfere with a legitimate prosecution by an
executive branch controlled by the opposite political party. At face
value, this objection might suggest the need for further refinement of
Rule VIII to ensure that it reflects Congress’s institutional interest in
the Speech or Debate Clause protection. It more likely understates
the measured involvement of House and Senate Counsels in
determining the applicability of Speech or Debate protections. Yet it
also arguably follows from the very rationale for the Speech or
Debate Clause—the ability to resist the executive branch as a matter
232
of political power.
C. Nondisclosure Contrasted with Bribery Prosecutions
Each of the above rationales in support of the conclusion that
searches of congressional offices violate the Clause applies equally to
bribery prosecutions. Bribery investigations deter legitimate
legislative activity because the inquiries they necessitate expose
candid—potentially
impolitic,
but
legitimate—legislative
233
undertakings. They present the potential for executive-branch
officials to influence or control a Member’s decisions by threat of

229. See Reckless Justice, supra note 71, at 15–16 (statement of Charles Tiefer, Professor,
University of Baltimore Law School) (noting that the difference between subpoenas and
searches is the absence of an adversarial process).
230. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1034.
231. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
233. Cf. supra Part IV.B.1.
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235

indictment, undermining the integrity of the legislative process,
236
potentially compromising the oversight function, and arguably
circumventing Congress’s institutional role under Article I, Section
237
5. At first glance, these similarities should seem problematic to the
reader, because the Clause permits bribery prosecutions, whereas this
Note has argued that it does not permit searches of congressional
offices.
This is where the difference between balance-of-powers
arguments and separation-of-powers analysis matters: bribery
prosecutions do not circumvent the Clause because Congress has
238
authorized the executive branch to investigate bribery. As noted by
the Court in Brewster, Congress retains the ability to constrain its
239
authorization of bribery prosecutions in a number of ways. Until it
does so, it appears that Congress has determined that prosecutions
for bribery protect the integrity of the legislative process in a way that
240
enhances, rather than harms, democratic representation.
Put
otherwise, Congress has already done the balancing. Courts’ leaving
234. See Ervin, supra note 52, at 191 (“[T]he mere threat of government inquiry into a
campaign contribution on the grounds of a possible violation of the bribery statutes can act as a
powerful political deterrent on Congressmen and Senators. It is a political fact of life that
rumors of criminal violations and threats of official investigations can seriously affect the
independence of a legislator.”).
235. See Lederkramer, supra note 17, at 492–95 (demonstrating the potential for the
Executive to control legislators’ behavior); see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 522
n.16 (1972) (acknowledging that “[t]he potential for harassment by an unscrupulous member of
the Executive branch may exist” and that “[a] strategically timed indictment could indeed cause
serious harm to a Congressman”).
236. Subpoenaing individuals to inform Congress requires knowledge, which, in turn,
requires a voluntary source of information—a source that Members cannot protect, as
determined in Gravel. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628 (1972). For a description of
the Court’s holding in Gravel, see supra notes 60–69 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 52.
238. The federal bribery statute applies to Members of Congress on its face. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘public official’ means Member of Congress . . . .’”). Members
are not immunized from criminal prosecution, see supra note 209 and accompanying text, and
investigations of any number of crimes may find their ways to the feet of sitting representatives.
239. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524 (1972) (“If we underestimate the
potential for harassment, the Congress, of course, is free to exempt its Members from the ambit
of federal bribery laws, but it has deliberately allowed the instant statute to remain on the books
for over a century.”). It stands to reason that any attempt by Congress to exempt its Members
from criminal statutes generally—rather than from those implicated solely by their exercise of
their congressional offices—would raise the specter of an Equal Protection Clause violation.
See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall Bind Equally on All: Congressional and
Executive Roles in Applying Laws to Congress, 48 ARK. L. REV. 105, 116 (1994) (noting this
potential constitutional problem).
240. Cf. supra notes 217, 227 and accompanying text.
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this decision to Congress avoids constitutionalizing this determination
on the basis of vague notions about the optimal balance of powers
that are subject to change with each generation and/or presidential
administration.
D. Accommodating Law-Enforcement Tools That Have Never Been
Considered Problematic
Having argued in Part IV.B that Rayburn comes out the same
under functionalist analysis as under formalist analysis, and then in
Part IV.C having distinguished between this functionalist reasoning
and balance-of-powers arguments, this Section now applies functional
separation-of-powers analysis to offer a basis for distinguishing
between procedural prerequisites to investigating Members and de
241
facto substantive immunity. Reading Renzi as a separation-ofpowers case demonstrates that it is possible to respect the executive
branch’s prerogative to investigate Members’ criminality without
unduly imposing upon legislative independence in violation of the
Speech or Debate Clause. Renzi is a good prototype for the question
of whether the Speech or Debate Clause forecloses “law enforcement
tools that have never been considered problematic”—not because the
242
case would have come out differently under the above analysis, but
243
because it demonstrates what these law-enforcement tools are.
Although individual Members do not have an absolute
244
“nondisclosure privilege,” the Speech or Debate Clause requires
more than ex parte permission from a court to use investigatory
methods that will result in necessary exposure to legislative-act
245
materials. Like the search in Rayburn, investigations that use
wiretaps—like the one at issue in in Renzi—necessarily result in
executive-branch exposure to legislative-act materials. The Clause’s
nondisclosure protection—Congress’s right to the prior assertion of
241. This Section does not engage in the formalist analysis from Part III because of space
constraints and because no legacy of executive-branch or congressional acquiescence in an
agreed-upon arrangement regarding wiretaps exists. Instead, the executive branch has
historically used wiretaps to surveil Members, though such conduct has often been used to
secure political gain rather than for legitimate law-enforcement purposes. See Brief for
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae at 27–
29, United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-10088, 10-10122).
242. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part III.
245. For commentary on ex parte access to legislative-act materials, see supra notes 84, 229
and accompanying text.
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its institutional interests—requires, in addition to a Title III wiretap
application, the executive branch’s cooperation with Congress to
protect Congress’s right to the prior assertion of the Speech or
Debate Clause; cooperation that can take place through House or
Senate Counsel. It is beyond the scope of this Note to articulate
exactly how this will work in practice. Instead, Rayburn counsels that
“how that accommodation is to be achieved is best determined by the
legislative and executive branches in the first instance,” and past
246
experience shows that such accommodation works in practice.
This conclusion is not a wild departure from past practice, nor
does it foreshadow de facto congressional immunity. Like seventy
247
Members before him, Congressman Jefferson was convicted without
248
reliance upon legislative-act materials. Putting aside the fact that
both Congressmen Jefferson and Renzi were convicted, conferring
with House Counsel about Members’ apparent wrongdoing is a
desirable first step in any investigation of congressional wrongdoing
given the possibility not only of targeted prosecutions and/or
249
250
intimidation, but also of stumbling upon legitimate false positives.
CONCLUSION
Although the D.C. Circuit did not write its opinion in United
States v. Rayburn House Office Building as a separation-of-powers
case, the opinion should be read as one. This Note has recast Rayburn
through separation-of-powers analysis to demonstrate the limited
nature of Rayburn’s holding. Had the Ninth Circuit conducted such
analysis in United States v. Renzi, it could have avoided announcing

246. For examples of such accommodation working in practice, see supra notes 78–80, 222–
24 and accompanying text.
247. Jonathan J. Cooper, Members of Congress Charged with a Crime, 1798–2008, WASH.
INDEP., (July 29, 2008, 5:31 PM), http://washingtonindependent.com/377/members-of-congresscharged-with-a-crime-1798-2008.
248. Congressman Jefferson was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia, which
declined “the government’s invitation to reconsider the constitutionality of the search” of his
congressional office as determined in Rayburn. See United States v. Jefferson, 615 F. Supp. 2d
448, 451 (E.D. Va. 2009). Congressman Renzi was also convicted. Aaron Blake, Ex-Rep. Rick
Renzi Sentenced to Three Years in Prison, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2013, 3:56 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/10/28/ex-rep-rick-renzi-sentencedto-three-years-in-prison. At the time this Note was published, his appeal was still pending.
Defendant Richard G. Renzi’s Notice of Appeal, United States v. Renzi, No. 13-10588 (9th Cir.
Nov. 8, 2013).
249. See supra notes 16 and 235 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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misleading dicta regarding the nature of the Speech or Debate
Clause’s nondisclosure protection. Renzi’s dicta holds the potential to
confound law-enforcement personnel, magistrate judges, and other
federal courts of appeal, and to forge a new path of least resistance
toward the use of search warrants, rather than subpoenas, in
congressional investigations.
Procedural protections and criminal prosecutions both have a
place in protecting political representation, and recognizing the
limited nature of the holding in Rayburn is essential to
accommodating both the Speech or Debate protection and the
executive branch’s enforcement interest. The D.C. Circuit’s
construction of the Speech or Debate Clause in Rayburn leaves
executive-branch officials considerable latitude in investigating
Members of Congress, subject to procedural constraints, which they
may choose to navigate by coordinating with their legislative-branch
counterparts. The Speech or Debate Clause protects legislative—not
legislators’—independence. Its nondisclosure protection provides
Congress the right to assert its institutional interests prior to the
executive branch’s compelling the disclosure of legislative-act
materials.

